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Abstract 
 
After a period of growing disconnectedness of regional markets following the 1992 price 
liberalization in Russia, a process of improvement in market integration started since about 1994. 
This paper analyzes the spatial pattern of goods market integration in the country in 1994-2000, 
characterizing Russian regions into three states: integrated with a benchmark region, not integrated 
but tending toward integration with it, and not integrated and not tending toward integration. The 
standard AR(1) model serves to test for market integration. To capture a movement toward 
integration (price convergence), a nonlinear time series model with an asymptotically decaying 
trend is proposed. The results obtained suggest that only a bit more than one fifth of the Russian 
regions can be deemed not integrated and not tending toward integration with the benchmark 
region over 1994–2000.  
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1. Introduction 
Political changes and Russia’s rapid shift in the early 1990s from the centrally planned 
economy to one governed by market principles gave rise to a dramatic regional fragmentation of 
its national market. The emergence of market institutions in the country turned this process back in 
about 1994. From that time on, a progressive improvement in market integration was observed, as 
Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) and Gluschenko (2003) found. Obviously, integration of the 
Russian market is spatially heterogeneous: each region can be integrated with some set of other 
regions and not integrated with another set. Moreover, a feature of the transition process is that 
some regions, not being integrated, are nonetheless moving toward integration. The above papers 
consider the temporal pattern of market integration in Russia rather than the spatial pattern 
because they use cross-sectional analysis, so obtaining results averaged over country’s regions. 
The aim of this paper is to obtain the spatial pattern of goods market integration in Russia in 
1994-2000, applying time series analysis. The spatial pattern is produced by classing each region 
with one of three groups: integrated with a benchmark region, not integrated but tending toward 
integration with it, or not integrated and not tending toward integration. The law of one price 
serves as the criterion of market integration. The data for the empirical analysis are time series of 
the cost of a staples basket across 75 (of all the 89) regions of Russia with a monthly frequency.  
The variable to be analyzed is the price differential between a given region and the 
benchmark one. Given that it is stationary, the law of one price holds, hence these regions are 
integrated. The conventional AR(1) model with no unit root describes such a behavior of the price 
differential. The movement toward integration is a nonstationary process that tends to stationarity 
over time. Such a process is modeled by an autoregression with a nonlinear, asymptotically 
decaying trend. Thus, a region is deemed tending toward integration when price in it converges to 
the benchmark-region price. If region’s price differential satisfies no one of these two models, the 
region is deemed not integrated and not tending toward integration. The models are also 
augmented for taking account of a structural break caused by the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. 
The results obtained suggest 54% of the covered Russian regions to be integrated with the 
benchmark region, 24% of regions tending toward integration with it, and 22% non-integrated 
with no trend toward integration. 
Examining market integration in Russia through time series analysis has been the subject of 
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studies by Berkowitz et al. (1998), Gardner and Brooks (1994), and Goodwin et al. (1999). 
Considering the early transition years, the first half of the 1990s, they find the Russian market 
poorly integrated with signs of potential improvement. The spatial patterns obtained suggest that 
only a few regions or cities can be deemed integrated in a certain sense. Berkowitz and DeJong 
(1999), albeit applying a cross-sectional approach, find an interesting feature of the spatial pattern 
of Russia’s market integration. They identify a Red Belt group of pro-Communist and anti-market-
reform regions as a culprit behind segmentation of the Russian market. 
This paper contributes to the above literature in two aspects. From the methodological 
standpoint, it proposes a new methodology of analyzing price convergence in the time-series 
context. From the empirical standpoint, the paper is complementary to the above ones in the sense 
of a wider spatial and temporal coverage: the analysis covers almost all Russian regions and a time 
span ending in 2000 (albeit missing the very early years of transition, 1992–1994). The results of 
this paper and Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) and Gluschenko (2003), taken jointly, provide 
a two-dimensional, time-space pattern of Russia’s market integration from the early years of 
transition to the beginning of the 2000s.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methodology of the 
analysis and the data used. Section 3 presents empirical results obtained. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Methodology and data 
2.1. Strategy of the analysis 
Perfect integration of a spatially distributed goods market implies an absence of 
impediments to the movement of goods between all spatial segments (e.g., national regions). In 
other words, a perfectly integrated market would operate like a single market despite spatial 
dispersion of its segments. The price of a (tradable) good across regions would be uniform so that 
the law of one price, maintained by inter-regional arbitrage, holds. Thus, the law of one price may 
be used as a theoretical benchmark for empirically analyzing goods market integration. 
Market integration in Russia can be seen as a two-stage process, involving an initial stage of 
progressive segmentation beginning in January 1992 and a second stage of increased integration 
beginning around 1994. The second stage is the subject of this study. Taking a pair of regions, it 
may be hypothesized that in this second stage of evolution, three types of the pairs can exist:       
(a) integrated regions, where price equality already prevails; (b) non-integrated regions tending 
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toward integration, i.e. prices are converging toward a common level; and (c) non-integrated 
regions that show no indication of an integrating trend. For brevity, hereafter regions from the 
second group are referred to as “regions tending toward integration,” and regions from the third 
group are referred to as simply “non-integrated regions.” 
In the above context, the term convergence of prices becomes ambiguous. Indeed, when 
considering types (a) and (b), two fundamentally distinct concepts of convergence are possible. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the difference between the concepts: the thin lines depict actual dynamics of 
prices, while the thick lines represent their theoretical long-run paths. (Hereafter, prt and pst denote 
the price of a good in regions r and s, respectively, at time t; p′ stands for a relative price.) 
 
  
(a) 
 
  
(b) 
 
Fig. 1. Two concepts of price convergence: (a) short-run convergence (ordinary 
cointegration); (b) long-run convergence (catching-up) combined with short-run one. 
 
These two concepts can be described as follows: 
Fig. 1(a) implies regions r and s are type (a). They are in spatial equilibrium, such that price 
disparities between regions are merely random shocks dying out over time. Prices fluctuate around 
parity and permanently tend to return to it. This is the case dealt with in the literature on the law of 
one price and purchasing power parity (PPP); it is sometimes referred to as “convergence to the 
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law of one price/PPP” in this literature. The term “convergence” here relates to the shocks, 
implying their convergence to zero. It characterizes the short-run behavior of prices, the long-run 
behavior of prices being described by the path 
prt/pst = 1,  t = 0,…,T. (1) 
Thus, this concept can be designated as “short-run convergence.” 
Fig. 1(b) implies that regions r and s are type (b). The regions are tending toward spatial 
equilibrium:  
1/lim =∞→ strtt pp . (2) 
(In the figure, the price in s catches up with the price in r.) Price disparity permanently diminishes 
over time, fluctuating around this general trend due to random shocks. This is the case the 
literature on economic growth (regarding incomes, outputs, etc.) refers to simply as 
“convergence.” Here, in the short run, the price disparity converges to the long-run path (i.e. 
random deviations die out over time), and the path itself converges to the parity line prt/pst = 1 over 
the long run. In this case, “convergence” relates to the prices themselves, implying long-run 
convergence of their differences to zero over time. Thus, this concept can be designated as “long-
run convergence.”1 
In Formulae (1) and (2), absolute price parity is taken as the steady state. This implies 
perfect integration – a rare condition in the real world. We would reasonably expect persistent 
(equilibrium) difference in prices between r and s induced by natural market frictions such as 
physical distance and difficult access to a number of regions. Thus, it may be more realistic to 
relax the criterion for market integration, allowing for such market frictions. In such case, relative 
price parity would have to be dealt with, unity in the right-hand side of Formulae (1) and (2) being 
substituted for an arbitrary constant ratio of prices, αrs.  
The trouble is that this α reflects both the effect of “natural,” irremovable market frictions 
(which is compatible with the notion of integration) and the effect of artificial, transient ones that 
impede market integration. This can be formalized as, e.g., α = αn(Lrs)⋅αa, where αn is the effect of 
transportations costs proxied by distance between r and s, Lrs, and αa is the effect of “anti-
                                                          
1 Econometrically, prices prt and pst in Fig.1(a) are nonstationary (unit root) processes. However, both have the same 
trend so that their ratio is stationary around 1. In Fig. 2(b), individual prices are also unit root processes, but they have 
different trends that converge to each other over time. Thus, the price ratio here is a nonstationary process tending 
over time to stationarity. 
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integration forces.” As Gluschenko (2010) finds, the latter effect is considerable in Russia. In the 
context of a pairwise time series analysis, however, there is no way to identify αn and αa 
separately. This is why the strict version of the law of one price is adopted in this study as a 
criterion of integration, any deterministic difference in prices being interpreted as an indication of 
non-integration.  Certainly, this may result in some understatement of the degree of market 
integration in Russia.  
Testing for the equality of prices or price levels, i.e. for relationship (1), is a conventional 
exercise in papers on the law of one price and PPP. The test is whether log local prices                
Prt = log(prt) and Pst = ln(pst) are cointegrated with the predetermined cointegrating vector (1, –1), 
or, equivalently, whether price differential Prst = log(prt/pst) is stationary. However, in providing an 
“all-or-nothing” answer, this traditional approach is impotent in revealing a transitional case 
described by relationship (2), i.e. the case when a process {Prst}t=0,…,T is not stationary, but tends to 
a stationary one over time. Using conventional cointegration analysis, such a process would be 
simply recognized as nonstationary, giving no way to separate region groups (b) and (c). 
There are several approaches to this problem. The issue of long-run convergence is 
extensively addressed in the economic growth literature (see e.g. the survey by Durlauf and Quah, 
1999). The most popular is the cross-sectional approach (examining β-convergence); different 
methods associated with the distribution dynamics approach are also of considerable use. Both 
approaches yield a spatially aggregated result, not a spatial pattern of convergence. They are thus 
unsuitable for solving our proposed problem. Therefore let us turn to the time series approach. 
Carlino and Mills (1996) consider a concept referred to as “stochastic convergence.” They 
employ a cointegration relationship with a deterministic linear trend. Provided that the trend of an 
inter-regional differential is directed toward zero, stationarity around this trend is supposed to be 
evidence of convergence. Cushman et al. (2001) apply a similar way to test for convergence of 
prices for foods in Kiev, Ukraine, to the prices for respective goods in the US. However, time 
series models with a linear trend are not compatible with relationship (2): having reached the zero 
value, the differential would be driven further by such a trend and increase again (in absolute 
value) with the opposite sign. 
Bernard and Durlauf (1995) define convergence essentially as in relationship (2), referring to 
such a concept as “forecast convergence.” However, turning to the issue of testing for 
convergence, they assume economies to be already in the steady state and apply standard 
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cointegration analysis. Thus, the authors actually restrict their definition of convergence to 
Equation (1). Which is to say the authors do not deal with “genuine,” long-run convergence, 
examining only whether it has been completed by the beginning of a given time period.2 
Nahar and Inder (2002) attempt to overcome this shortcoming, suggesting a test for long-run 
convergence. Bentzen (2003) applies it to study convergence of gasoline prices in OECD 
countries. The idea of the Nahar-Inder test is as follows. The evolution of disparity between two 
locations is modeled as (log(Prst))2 = h(t) + εt, where h(t) is a long-run trend, and εt is a residual 
with standard properties. A polynomial of some degree k approximates function h(t), so that 
(log(Prst))2 = α0 + α1t + α2t2 +…+ αktk + εt. If long-run convergence happens, then h(t) is 
decreasing with time; hence, dh(t)/dt < 0 must hold for all t. To test for convergence, the authors 
check whether the time average of this derivative is negative: 
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However, it is not equivalent to the negativity of dh(t)/dt in all points in time. Therefore, the test is 
not adequate. This is easy to see, considering a continuous-time counterpart of the above 
relationship: 
0))0()((1)(1
0
<−=∫ hThTdtdttdhT
T
.  
Thus, merely the fact that h(T) < h(0) suffices to accept the convergence hypothesis. In the general 
case, this obviously does not evidence long-run convergence. For example, a U-shape path of 
disparity may satisfy this test. (Besides, the test does not take account of probable autocorrelation, 
which makes it impossible to discriminate between deterministic and stochastic trends.)  
The failure of the Nahar-Inder method is due to too general representation of the long-run 
trend. A way out is to restrict the function class used to model the trend to functions a priory 
known to satisfy relationship (2). These are asymptotically decaying functions. Adopting this 
approach and taking a specific asymptotically decaying function to characterize the trend, 
convergence of prices can be modeled as  
prt/pst = 1 + γeδt, δ < 0.  (3) 
                                                          
2 In the literature on economic growth, the term “convergence” had definitely meant catching-up until Bernard and 
Durlauf’s (1995) paper caused confusion in this term similar to that in the literature on spatial price dynamics. 
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To economize notation, the region indices for parameters (and the disturbances discussed below) 
are suppressed.  
Parameter δ defines convergence rate; γ is the initial (at t = 0) value of price disparity. The 
sign of γ shows the direction of convergence. If γ < 0, the price in r increases faster than in s and 
catches up with the latter. If γ > 0, the price in r rises slower than in s. If γ = 0, Equation (3) 
degenerates to Equation (1), implying that convergence of prices has completed by the start of the 
time period under consideration. Hence, the law of one price holds for regions r and s.  
2.2. Econometrics 
To derive a testable version of relationship (3), the logarithmic representation of prices is 
used and random shocks, νt, are taken into account. They are presumed to be a first-order 
autoregressive process: 
Prst = log(1 + γeδt) + νt,   νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt,  (4) 
where εt is white noise, and γ, δ, and λ are parameters to be estimated. Hereafter, t = 1,…,T. 
Substituting the second equation in (4) into the first gives a nonlinear model to be estimated and 
tested: 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + log(1 + γeδt) – (λ + 1)log(1 + γeδ(t – 1)) + εt.  (5) 
The tests have to answer whether time series {Prst} has no unit root, i.e. that the process is 
stationary, and if so, whether it contains a trend of the given form, i.e. γ ≠ 0 and δ ≠ 0. That is, the 
hypotheses tested are Hλ: λ = 0 (against λ < 0), Hγ: γ = 0 (against γ ≠ 0), and Hδ: δ ≠ 0 (against δ = 0).  
The joint rejection of Hλ, Hγ, and Hδ is interpreted as evidence that the time series tested 
fluctuates around a deterministic trend of the given form. Provided that δ < 0, the trend is an 
asymptotically decaying one. Hence, prices in regions r and s are converging to the equality, so 
these regions are classed with those tending toward integration. With δ > 0, the prices are 
deterministically diverging; thus, these regions are non-integrated.  
If either of Hγ and Hδ (or both) is not rejected, this means that there is no deterministic trend 
in the time series. In such an event, as well as in the case of nonrejection of a unit root, it is tested 
whether law (1) governs the process. We obtain a testable version of Equation (1) as above: 
Prst = νt,νt = (λ + 1)νt–1 + εt;  (6) 
combining these equation gives 
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∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + εt,  (7) 
which is the conventional AR(1) model. 
The hypothesis tested here is whether the time series has a unit root, Hλ: λ = 0 (against λ < 0). 
Its rejection implies that the time series fluctuates around zero, i.e. around the equality of prices in 
regions r and s. Therefore, such regions are classed as integrated. If Hλ is not rejected, the regions 
are deemed non-integrated. 
Note the different roles of parameters γ and δ vs. parameter λ. The first two characterize the 
long-run behavior of the price differential path, while λ characterizes the short-run properties of 
adjustment toward this path. (In the degenerate case of AR(1), the path is a straight line along the 
time axis that represents price parity.) Parameter λ is interpreted as the rate deviations from the 
long-run path caused by random shocks die out. Alternatively, tHLS = log(0.5)/log(1 + λ) defines 
the half-life time of these random price disparities. With a unit root, i.e. λ = 0, tHLS = ∞. Thus, the 
effect of random shocks is permanent, preventing the price differential from returning to a long-
run path; hence, no long-run path exists. With no autocorrelation, i.e. λ = –1, the return to the 
long-run path is instantaneous: tHLS = 0. Parameter δ is the rate the deterministic price disparity 
tends to zero. Similarly to the half-life time of random price disparities, the half-life time of the 
deterministic price disparity can be defined as the time the disparity takes to halve: tHLL = log(0.5)/δ.  
There is a peculiarity of price dynamics in Russia that complicates the above analysis. The 
point is that a number of regional price time series contain a structural break caused by the August 
1998 financial crisis in the country. The break point θ is not uniform across regions, varying from 
1998:08 through 1999:02. Taking account of this peculiarity produces a number of additional 
models that are modifications of Equations (5) and (7). Dummy variable Bθt such that Bθt = 1 if t < θ, 
and zero otherwise models the structural change.  
Incorporating the structural change dummy into Equation (5), it takes the form  
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + log(1 + (γ + γBBθt)eδt) – (λ + 1)log(1 + (γ + γBBθ,t–1)eδ(t – 1)) + εt.  (5*) 
In Equation (5*), the initial price disparity is γ + γB. Its sign shows the direction of convergence 
before the break point. The sign of γ shows the convergence direction from the break point. If the 
signs of γ and γB are the same, the break causes a price jump toward parity; and opposite signs 
imply the jump away from parity, provided that |γ| > |γB|. (The opposite inequality produces an 
exotic case of “overshooting.” The break crosses the price parity line, reversing the direction of 
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convergence after the break point. Aside from insignificant γs, there are no such cases among 
estimates obtained.) In addition to the hypotheses tested for Model (5), one more hypothesis is 
tested for Model (5*): HB: γB = 0 (against γB ≠ 0), checking whether there is a structural break in a 
tested series. In the case of joint rejection of Hλ, Hγ, HB, and Hδ regions r and s are classed with 
those tending toward integration if δ < 0, and with non-integrated regions if δ > 0. 
In contrast to Model (5), the case of γ = 0 in Model (5*) does not always imply the absence 
of the trend if there is a structural break. Such a case may evidence that prices in regions r and s 
have become equal from the date of the break point onward, i.e. that the regions have become 
integrated. This leads to the following equation: 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + log(1 + γBBθteδt) – (λ + 1)log(1 + γBBθ,t–1eδ(t – 1)) + εt.  (5**) 
Hypotheses Hλ, HB, and Hδ are tested for it. It is seen that this model is a combination of Models 
(5) and (7). The price differential dynamics is characterized by Model (5) when t < θ; and by 
Model (7) on the time interval from θ  to T. The sign of δ  in Model (5**) does not matter, as the 
behavior of prices after the break is of interest for us. However, the case of δ > 0 would be strange 
and seems hardly probable in practice. (No one such case occurred among estimates obtained.)  
Augmenting Model (7) for structural break, we have 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + γB(Bθt – (λ + 1) Bθ,t–1) + εt.3 
To make the values of estimates comparable across models, let us transform the above equation 
into an equivalent form:  
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + log(1 + γBBθt) – (λ + 1)log(1 + γBBθ,t–1) + εt  (7*) 
Note that the break dummy Bθt is constructed so that the break in this model is always directed 
toward parity. This is done to test whether regions r and s have become integrated after the date of 
structural change. This is the case when both hypotheses Hλ and HB are rejected. Given γB > 0, the 
crisis caused price-cutting in region r as compared to s. It otherwise increased the relative price in r.  
Making inferences regarding Models (7*) and (5), two traps are to be avoided. The first is 
                                                          
3 This specification is derived from (6), in which the first equation is augmented with the break dummy. This differs 
from the classical Perron (1990) specification. The common use of two dummies to characterize the break – level 
dummy and pulse dummy – is superfluous. The latter, equaling 1 if t = θ, and 0 otherwise, can be represented as       
Bθt – Bθ,t-1. The Perron-type equation is a linear approximation of the proposed specification, allowing the coefficients 
on Bθt and Bθ,t-1 to be independent. This leads to parameter estimates that, while consistent, are not asymptotically 
efficient. For this reason the use of more adequate nonlinear specification provides a more powerful unit root test. See 
Gluschenko (2005) for details. 
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that of a spurious break. Let the path of the price differential is stepwise so that Prst = γ + γB with   
t < θ, and Prst =  γ  with t ≥ θ. As model (7*) assumes γ = 0, it can give a statistically significant 
estimate of γB (with rejection of Hλ), taking a typical random shock for the structural break. Hence, 
it is to be checked whether γ = 0 holds indeed. The second trap is due to that Model (5) can 
approximate a stepwise path by a deterministic trend, seemingly suggesting that regions r and s are 
tending toward integration, while they are in fact non-integrated, if γ ≠ 0 in the stepwise path, or 
integrated, if γ = 0 in it. Thus, we have to discriminate between these three cases. The following 
auxiliary equation helps to avoid both traps: 
∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + log(1 + γ  + γBBθt) – (λ + 1)log(1 + γ + γBBθ,t–1) + εt.  (7**) 
(Note that it is equivalent to ∆Prst = λPrs,t–1 + γ  + γB(Bθt – (λ + 1) Bθ,t–1) + εt, except for numerical 
values of γ and γB.) 
Hypotheses Hλ, Hγ, and HB are tested for Model (7**). We may turn to Model (7*) only 
when HB is rejected and Hγ is not. When all the three hypotheses are rejected, regions r and s are 
non-integrated, provided that Model (5) is rejected. 
If both Models (7**)/(7*) and (5) appear acceptable (Hλ, Hγ, and HB are rejected for (7**), 
or HB is rejected and Hγ is not for it with rejection of Hλ and HB for (7*), and Hλ, Hγ, and Hδ are 
rejected for (5)), the following specification test based on the Monte Carlo method is performed to 
choose between them. Denote H1: (5) is true specification and H2: (7**)/(7*) is true specification. 
In the first stage of the test, suppose hypothesis H1 to hold for a given pair (r, s) and generate N 
simulations of Model (5) (in the empirical work reported in Section 3, N was equal to 100,000). 
That is, compute N series of Prst through Equation (5) with λ, γ, δ, and σε estimated on the actual 
data and εt ∼ N(0, 2εσ ). For each simulation, estimate Models (5) and (7**)/(7*) and calculate 
their simulated log likelihood ratio (LLR). Having obtained the set of N estimated LLRs, calculate 
the empirical distribution of LLR, and use this as the basis for inference in judging H1 against H2. 
The second stage of the test is similar, reversing the roles of H1 and H2. If the first stage of the test 
does not reject H1 and the second stage rejects H2, Model (5) is accepted. If the first stage rejects 
H1 and the second stage does not reject H2, Model (7**)/(7*) is accepted. In the case that the 
inferences are inconsistent across the stages, rejecting both hypotheses or neither of them, the J 
test is performed. 
The above set of models may seem involved. In fact, it has a simple and transparent logical 
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structure and can de derived from the only Model (5*). This model encompasses all the rest of 
models, generating three levels of nesting with setting some subset of its (structural) parameters to 
zero. Imposing restrictions γ = 0, or δ = 0, or γB = 0 on Model (5*), we get the first level consisting 
of three mutually nonnested Models (5**), (7**), and (5), respectively. Restrictions δ = 0 and γ = 0, 
or δ = 0 and γB = 0 on Model (5*) generate the second level of nesting that contains Model (7*) 
and a model omitted in our set, a conventional AR(1) model with constant α = –λlog(1 + γ). 
Equivalently, Model (7*) is a result of imposing restriction δ = 0 on Model (5**) or restriction γ = 0 
on Model (7**); restriction γB = 0 on Model (7**) or restriction δ = 0 on Model (5) produces the 
AR(1) with constant. At last, the only Model (7) represents the third level of nesting. We get it, 
restricting three parameters in Model (5**), γ = 0 and γB = 0 and δ = 0. This model can be also 
generated by restriction γB = 0 on Model (7*) or by restriction γ = 0 on the AR(1) with constant. 
Fig. 2 clarifies the considered relationships. Table 1 summarizes the correspondence between 
models characterizing price dynamics in a pair of regions and types of the regions from this pair. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of the model set. 
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(5**) (7**) (5) 
(7*) 
(7) 
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Table 1  
Models vs. region types 
 
Model Type of region 
(7), (7*), and (5**) Integrated 
(5) with δ < 0, and (5*) with δ < 0 Tending toward integration 
(7**), (5) with δ > 0, (5*) with δ > 0, and none  Non-integrated 
 
 
The AR(1) model with constant is superfluous for our purposes. Be it accepted for some 
regions r and s, this would imply that they are non-integrated, as there a permanent price disparity 
γ  between them. But Model (7) gives the same answer for these r and s. Since the model of Prs is 
misspecified due to omitted constant, a unit root will not be rejected in Model (7), again 
evidencing non-integration of r and s. 
Seemingly, if one of structural parameters in Model (5*) proves to be insignificant, we have 
to turn to a respective model of the next level. However, this is true only for the case of 
nonrejection of Hγ that leads to Model (5**). But the nonrejection of Hδ is not a sign that Model 
(5) is not valid, as well as the nonrejection of HB does not guarantee invalidity of Model (7**). As 
noted above, these two models are competitive in characterizing price dynamics, while Model 
(5**) does not compete with them. At any rate, every time when Model (5**) appeared 
acceptable, a specification test similar to that described above easily rejected specifications (5) and 
(7**) in favor of (5**).  
Based on the above considerations, the procedure of analyzing each time series {Prt} is as 
follows: 
Step 1. Model (5*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses Hλ, Hγ, HB, and Hδ are jointly 
rejected, regions r and s are deemed to be tending to integration in the case of δ < 0 and non-
integrated in the case of δ > 0, {Prst} containing a structural break. Then analysis finishes. 
Otherwise, if HB and Hδ  are rejected, the analysis comes to Step 2, while if this is not the case, the 
analysis continues at Step 3. 
Step 2. Model (5**) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses Hλ, HB, and Hδ are jointly rejected, r 
and s are deemed integrated; the analysis finishes. Otherwise, the analysis comes to Step 3. 
Step 3. Model (7**) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses Hλ, Hγ, and HB are jointly 
rejected, model (7**) is potentially accepted. Anyway the analysis continues at Step 5 except for 
the case of nonrejection of Hγ, when it comes to Step 4.  
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Step 4. Model (7*) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses Hλ and HB are jointly rejected, 
model (7*) is potentially accepted. The analysis comes to Step 5 in any case. 
Step 5. Model (5) is estimated and tested. If hypotheses Hλ, Hγ, HB, and Hδ are jointly 
rejected and neither (7**) nor (7*) has been potentially accepted, r and s are deemed to be tending 
to integration, given that δ < 0, or non-integrated, given that δ > 0; the analysis finishes. If these 
hypotheses are rejected but there is a potentially accepted alternative model, the analysis comes to 
Step 6. Given insignificant estimates in Model (5) and no potentially accepted model, the analysis 
comes to Step 7. If there is such a model, it turns from potentially to actually accepted one and the 
analysis finishes. (In the case that Model (7**) is accepted, r and s are deemed non-integrated; 
accepting Model (7*) implies that they are integrated, {Prst} containing a structural break in both 
cases.) 
Step 6. The specification test is performed, choosing between models (7**)/(7*) and (5). 
Depending on its results, regions r and s are deemed non-integrated, integrated, or tending to 
integration – if Model (7**) or (5) with δ > 0, or (7*), or (5) with δ < 0 is accepted, 
correspondingly. Then analysis finishes.  
Step 7. Model (7) is estimated and tested. If the unit root hypothesis, Hλ, is rejected, r and s 
are deemed to be integrated and non-integrated otherwise. 
Let us consider some technical details of estimations.4 For testing the unit root hypotheses, 
Hλ, the t-statistic of λ is used. The distributions of this statistic for regressions (5), (5*), (5**), 
(7*), and (7**) not only are nonstandard, but they also differ from the Dickey-Fuller distributions 
and have not been documented in the literature. Denote the t-statistics for the respective 
regressions by τNL, τNL(θ),τ*NL(θ), τ0(θ), and τc(θ); argument θ indicates that the distribution 
depends on break point, θ (τ0 and τc with no argument stand for the Dickey-Fuller τ-statistic for 
Equation (7) and AR(1) with constant, respectively). To derive p-values of the unit root tests, the 
empirical distributions of these statistics under the null hypothesis of random walk have been 
estimated with the use of the Monte Carlo method with 1,000,000 simulations. Appendix A reports 
some results of this work, tabulating selected critical values of the τ-statistics. 
To test for a unit root, two tests are employed, which are the Phillips-Perron test and ADF 
                                                          
4 An EViews-based program for estimating and testing Model (5) and a program for obtaining empirical distribution 
of τNL for any sample size are available at http://econom.nsu.ru/staff/chair_et/Gluschenko/Research/Econometrics.htm. 
Instructions to these programs report additional technical details.   
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test in the case of Equation (7) and their modifications for other regressions. The unit root 
hypothesis, Hλ, is deemed rejected if both tests reject it. In the Phillips-Perron test, the Phillips 
(1987) transformation is applied to relevant τˆ , using the Newey-West (1994) automatic 
bandwidth selection method with the Bartlett spectral kernel. The adjusted value of the τ-statistic 
determines p-value of the test through p(τ), the respective estimated distribution. (Given Equation 
(7), this is the Dickey-Fuller distribution of τ0.) In the ADF test, the Schwarz information criterion 
serves for choosing the optimal lag length. In doing so, the lag length varies from 0 to               
Kmax = [12(T/100)1/4], where [⋅] stands for integer part, while the number of included observations 
remains constant and equals T – 1 – Kmax (Ng and Perron, 2005). Having found the optimal lag 
length, reestimation of the relevant regression on actual sample yields the adjusted value of the τ-
statistic, which, in turn, determines p-value of the ADF test.  
To find the break point, Equations (5*) and (7**) are estimated for each possible point,        
θ = 1998:08,…,1999:02. Then θ that yields the least sum of squared residuals is taken. Equations 
(5**) and (7*) inherit estimated θ  from (5*) and (7**), respectively. (While experimenting with θ 
estimated in each of the four regressions independently, for the most part the estimates proved to 
be the same across the models.)  
2.3. Data 
The subjects of the Russian Federation are taken as regions. The price data were collected in 
capital cities of the regions. The sample covers 75 of Russia’s 89 regions. Data are lacking for ten 
autonomous okrugs, the Chechen Republic, and the Republic of Ingushetia. Two other regions are 
omitted. The City of Moscow is simultaneously a separate subject of the Russian Federation 
(“city-region”) and the capital city of the surrounding Moscow Oblast. The same holds for St. 
Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast. That is why these city-regions are present in the sample, 
while their surrounding oblasts are not. 
The price representative for the analysis is the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods 
defined as the standard by the Russian statistical agency, Goskomstat (at present, Rosstat), 
between January 1997 and June 2000. This basket covers about one third of foodstuffs involved in 
the Russian CPI. But unlike the CPI, the staples basket has constant weights across regions and 
time. Goskomstat (1996) provides a description of basket composition. The costs of the basket 
(including those for the second half of 2000 and retrospectively calculated for 1994–1996) were 
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obtained directly from Goskomstat. A more detailed description of this data set is given in 
Gluschenko (2003).  
The data are monthly, spanning 84 months, from January 1994 to December 2000. There are 
missing observations in the time series used. Most occur in 1994, which has 42 missing 
observations (4.7% of the yearly total) in 17 regional time series. The remainder of the data set 
lacks only 9 observations. To fill the gaps, missing prices are approximated by the food 
component of the regional monthly CPIs. The interpolated value of prt is the arithmetic mean of 
the nearest known preceding price inflated to the required time point, t, and the nearest known 
succeeding price deflated to t. 
Fig. 3 shows actual time-series data for representative regions of types (a), (b), and (c), 
anticipating things to be reported in the next section. Appendix B Fig. B1 through B4 depict these 
by “sub-type” according to Table 1. Plots in Fig. 3(a) and 3(b) are counterparts of plots in Fig. 1(a) 
and 1(b), albeit in logarithmic terms. The long-run trend in Fig. 3(b) is computed with the use of 
estimated γ and δ reported in Table 2 below. As is seen, the actual data do tend to exhibit the 
stylized behavior depicted in Fig. 1. Fig. 3(c) additionally demonstrates a case of non-integration. 
For this region pair, the Saratov and Magadan oblasts, no one of our models rejects unit root. 
3. Empirical results 
The 75 series of regional prices in the data set used yield 2,775 region pairs. Therefore, we 
need to reduce such a mass of pairwise comparisons. On the other hand, only 74 of the pairs are 
independent. This makes the reduction of the number of pairs to such a number imminently 
reasonable. The standard approach in the literature on the law of one price and PPP is to pick some 
region as a benchmark, using its price as a numeraire. Unfortunately, there are no obvious 
evidences for a priori choosing a proper benchmark among regions under consideration.  
To solve this problem, the estimations were run with taking each of 75 regions as the 
benchmark in order to select the “best” one.5  (Thus, this did involve all 2,775 pairs).  Appendix C 
 
                                                          
5 In doing so, a simplified way of choosing between Models (7**)/(7*) and (5) by comparison of their estimated log 
likelihoods has been used rather than the computationally intensive specification test based on the Monte Carlo 
method. Thorough testing might change some of these choices. However, a random inspection for a number of 
benchmark regions suggests that such changes are few in number. For example, in the actual pattern for the Saratov 
Oblast, the number of regions tending toward integration decreases by one, so increasing by one the number of non-
integrated regions.  
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Fig. 3. Behavior of actual time series: (a) integrated regions; (b) regions tending toward 
integration; (c) non-integrated regions. 
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supplies summary of these results. The Saratov Oblast was chosen as the final benchmark among 
three regions that generate the most numbers of integrated pairs (40 to 42). One region was 
discarded because of greater number of non-integrated pairs. One more region, the Kabardian-
Balkar Republic, has a small advantage, yielding the number of integrated pairs greater by one 
with the same number of pairs tending toward integration. But the Kabardian-Balkar Republic 
seems poorly representative, being a small North-Caucasian region. For this reason, it was 
discarded, too. So, integration of each region with the Saratov Oblast is analyzed below. Thus, 
index s in the above models is fixed and corresponds to this region. Throughout this study, the 
10% significance level is adopted in all cases. 
Table 2 reports the final estimation results, i.e. estimates of a model selected for each region 
as well as results of unit root tests for this model. (Appendix D reports the full set of estimates and 
results of specification tests.) Regions are grouped by economic area, ekonomicheskiy rayon, as in 
Goskomstat’s statistical publications prior to June 2000 (except the Kaliningrad Oblast which is 
added here to the Northwestern Economic Area). The selected model determines a set of 
parameters reported in the table. Given all parameters λ, γ, γB, and δ, this means the acceptance of 
Model (5*). Reporting λ, γB, and δ implies that Model (5**) is accepted; λ, γ, and δ correspond to 
Model (5); and λ, γ, and γB correspond to Model (7**) . If there are only λ and γB in a given row, 
then Model (7*) is accepted; and the only parameter λ is reported when Model (7) is accepted. The 
latter case may also imply that none model is selected provided that a unit is not rejected in Model 
(7). Bold italic marks the number of a non-integrated region. Recall that the correspondence 
between the models and region types is tabulated in Table 1. If there is a structural break in a 
given time series (γB is reported), a footnote to the table provides its point in time.  
Out of 74 regions, 40 are integrated with the Saratov Oblast, 18 are tending toward 
integration with it, and 16 are neither integrated nor tending toward integration. Thus, considering 
the period of 1994–2000, more than a half (54%) of region pairs exhibit market integration and 
about a quarter (24%) of them move to this state, while only a bit more than a fifth (22%) of pairs 
do not show evidence of integration. Out of the latter, four pairs include difficult-to-access regions 
(the Republic of Sakha and the Kamchatka, Magadan and Sakhalin oblasts). They are remote Far-
Eastern regions lacking railway and road communication with other regions. In these regions, 
arbitrage can hardly be bilateral since goods are imported only. Therefore, the difficult-to-access 
regions are reasonably expected  to be non-integrated and to remain such in the foreseeable future. 
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Table 2 
Estimation and unit root test results 
 
Region 
Unit root test 
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
λ Initial disparity, γ 
Structural break, 
γB 
Convergence rate, 
δ 
I. Northern Economic Area 
  1. Rep. of Karelia 0.008/0.007 -0.422 (0.091) 0.436 (0.060)***   -0.012 (0.003)*** 
  2. Rep. of Komid  0.002/0.000 -0.497 (0.098) 0.207 (0.084)** 0.266 (0.071)*** -0.013 (0.004)*** 
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 0.022/0.011 -0.389 (0.090) 0.625 (0.074)***   -0.017 (0.003)*** 
  4. Vologda Obl. 0.008/0.010 -0.143 (0.055)     
  5. Murmansk Obl. 0.057/0.076 -0.238 (0.072) 0.727 (0.146)***   -0.009 (0.004)** 
II. Northwestern Economic Area 
  6. St. Petersburg City 0.132/0.076 -0.069 (0.040)     
  7. Novgorod Obl. 0.032/0.012 -0.141 (0.055)     
  8. Pskov Obl. 0.005/0.003 -0.194 (0.063)     
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. 0.002/0.002 -0.217 (0.069)     
III. Central Economic Area 
10. Bryansk Obl.b 0.040/0.027 -0.167 (0.069)  -0.073 (0.030)**  
11. Vladimir Obl. 0.000/0.000 -0.298 (0.077)     
12. Ivanovo Obl. 0.003/0.056 -0.215 (0.067)     
13. Kaluga Obl. 0.003/0.003 -0.205 (0.067)     
14. Kostroma Obl. 0.001/0.001 -0.257 (0.074)     
15. Moscow City b 0.064/0.078 -0.220 (0.069) 0.951 (0.314)*** -0.478 (0.240)** -0.011 (0.005)** 
16. Oryol Obl.b 0.036/0.053 -0.134 (0.057)  -0.098 (0.035)***  
17. Ryazan Obl. 0.009/0.006 -0.150 (0.054)     
18. Smolensk Obl.b 0.001/0.001 -0.401 (0.091) 0.056 (0.030)* -0.109 (0.035)***  
19. Tver Obl. 0.004/0.002 -0.213 (0.068)     
20. Tula Obl.b 0.040/0.029 -0.234 (0.072) 0.076 (0.038)* -0.113 (0.042)***  
21. Yaroslavl Obl. 0.012/0.047 -0.147 (0.055)     
IV. Volga-Vyatka Economic Area 
22. Rep. of Mariy El  0.045/0.042 -0.100 (0.050)     
23. Rep. of Mordovia d 0.050/0.030 -0.239 (0.074) -0.127 (0.027)*** 0.071 (0.031)**  
24. Chuvash Rep.  0.027/0.012 -0.150 (0.059)     
25. Kirov Obl. 0.001/0.001 -0.256 (0.075)     
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 0.024/0.017 -0.339 (0.083) 0.353 (0.207)*   -0.114 (0.059)* 
V. Central Black-Soil Economic Area 
27. Belgorod Obl. 0.010/0.004 -0.194 (0.066)     
28. Voronezh Obl. 0.015/0.013 -0.368 (0.087) -0.258 (0.076)***   -0.051 (0.020)** 
29. Kursk Obl. 0.002/0.001 -0.239 (0.070)     
30. Lipetsk Obl. 0.010/0.006 -0.183 (0.065)     
31. Tambov Obl.b 0.005/0.004 -0.223 (0.068)  -0.080 (0.024)***  
VI. Volga-Region Economic Area 
32. Rep. of Kalmykia  0.000/0.000 -0.349 (0.083)     
33. Rep. of Tatarstan  0.046/0.045 -0.078 (0.039)     
34. Astrakhan Obl. 0.000/0.015 -0.326 (0.081)     
35. Volgograd Obl. 0.002/0.016 -0.247 (0.073)     
36. Penza Obl. 0.011/0.006 -0.176 (0.063)     
37. Samara Obl. 0.077/0.093 -0.086 (0.041)     
38. Saratov Obl. (Benchmark region) 
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. 0.018/0.018 -0.313 (0.077) -0.274 (0.047)***   -0.009 (0.004)** 
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Region 
Unit root test 
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
λ Initial disparity, γ 
Structural break, 
γB 
Convergence rate, 
δ 
VII. Northern Caucasus Economic Area 
40. Rep. of Adygeya  0.000/0.000 -0.319 (0.081)     
41. Rep. of Dagestan 0.000/0.004 -0.376 (0.085)     
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  0.006/0.005 -0.170 (0.059)     
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep.c 0.004/0.005 -0.249 (0.076)  0.056 (0.031)*  
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  0.003/0.001 -0.235 (0.071)     
45. Krasnodar Krai 0.000/0.030 -0.394 (0.089)     
46. Stavropol Krai 0.000/0.000 -0.401 (0.089)     
47. Rostov Obl. 0.000/0.000 -0.321 (0.083)     
VIII. Urals Economic Area 
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan  0.001/0.019 -0.215 (0.066)     
49. Udmurt Rep.  0.001/0.001 -0.229 (0.068)     
50. Kurgan Obl. 0.003/0.004 -0.476 (0.095) 0.475 (0.110)***   -0.090 (0.023)*** 
51. Orenburg Obl. 0.002/0.002 -0.541 (0.099) 0.337 (0.088)***   -0.077 (0.023)*** 
52. Perm Obl. 0.009/0.009 -0.376 (0.085) 0.370 (0.067)***   -0.027 (0.006)*** 
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. 0.020/0.017 -0.348 (0.085) 0.338 (0.062)***   -0.014 (0.005)*** 
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. 0.003/0.002 -0.511 (0.098) 0.228 (0.040)***   -0.016 (0.005)*** 
IX. Western Siberian Economic Area 
55. Rep. of Altai e 0.000/0.000 -0.444 (0.091)  0.148 (0.024)***  
56. Altai Krai e 0.000/0.000 -0.553 (0.096) -0.075 (0.016)*** 0.124 (0.020)***  
57. Kemerovo Obl. e 0.001/0.001 -0.511 (0.093)  0.300 (0.047)*** -0.013 (0.005)** 
58. Novosibirsk Obl.e 0.012/0.010 -0.244 (0.066) 0.113 (0.036)*** 0.077 (0.041)*  
59. Omsk Obl.e 0.000/0.000 -0.405 (0.090)  0.044 (0.018)**  
60. Tomsk Obl. c 0.000/0.000 -0.577 (0.097)  0.170 (0.016)***  
61. Tyumen Obl.d 0.065/0.054 -0.199 (0.067) 0.115 (0.051)** 0.106 (0.056)*  
X. Eastern Siberian Economic Area 
62. Rep. of Buryatia a 0.005/0.003 -0.415 (0.092) 0.226 (0.092)** 0.184 (0.068)*** -0.011 (0.005)** 
63. Rep. of Tuva d  0.001/0.001 -0.427 (0.092) 0.236 (0.033)*** 0.176 (0.040)***  
64. Rep. of Khakasia c  0.000/0.000 -0.534 (0.097) 0.141 (0.023)*** 0.061 (0.028)**  
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai c 0.000/0.000 -0.561 (0.099) 0.045 (0.020)** 0.133 (0.024)*** 0.008 (0.005)* 
66. Irkutsk Obl c 0.000/0.000 -0.598 (0.102) 0.132 (0.029)*** 0.223 (0.038)***  
67. Chita Obl. 0.001/0.001 -0.606 (0.101) 0.721 (0.048)***   -0.015 (0.002)*** 
XI. Far Eastern Economic Area 
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia) c  0.000/0.000 -0.446 (0.092) 0.765 (0.063)*** 0.575 (0.084)***  
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl.c 0.005/0.004 -0.397 (0.089) 0.336 (0.088)*** 0.238 (0.062)*** -0.008 (0.003)** 
70. Primorsky Krai 0.027/0.023 -0.327 (0.083) 0.869 (0.098)***   -0.010 (0.003)*** 
71. Khabarovsk Krai d 0.016/0.015 -0.324 (0.083) 0.469 (0.128)*** 0.239 (0.085)*** -0.007 (0.004)* 
72. Amur Obl.e 0.005/0.003 -0.311 (0.074) 0.176 (0.042)*** 0.225 (0.052)***  
73. Kamchatka Obl.d 0.000/0.000 -0.509 (0.097) 0.776 (0.054)*** 0.489 (0.070)***  
74. Magadan Obl. 0.234/0.235 -0.011 (0.010)     
75. Sakhalin Obl. 0.280/0.280 -0.012 (0.012)     
Notes: 1. PP and ADF stand for the Phillips-Perron test and augmented Dickey-Fuller test, respectively; 2. Standard 
errors are in parentheses; 3. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*); 4. Numbers of non-integrated regions are 
marked with bold italic; 5. ‘Obl.’ stands for Oblast and ‘Rep.’ stands for Republic. 
a Break in 1998:08.  
b Break in 1998:09.  
c Break in 1998:11.  
d Break in 1998:12.  
e Break in 1999:01. 
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The pattern obtained fundamentally differs from the patterns of poor market integration in Russia 
found for the very early years of transition by Berkowitz et al. (1998), Gardner and Brooks (1994), 
and Goodwin et al. (1999).  
Among integrated region pairs, Model (7) describes price dynamics in 32 cases. Model (7*) 
is valid for seven pairs, and Model (5**) is valid in the only case of the Kemerovo Oblast. This 
implies that eight regions had been non-integrated before the structural breaks caused by the 1998 
financial crisis and became integrated after the breaks. Thus, the 1998 crisis facilitated price 
equalizing among Russian regions, improving the pattern of market integration. (The reasons for 
this will be discussed later.) In three region pairs, the break was upward, suggesting increases in 
prices relative to the benchmark region; the remaining five cases are those of price-cutting. The 
half-life times in the group of integrated regions, tHLS, vary from 0.8 to 8.5 months with the 
average equaling 3.1 months. 
The evolution of prices among region pairs tending toward integration is characterized by 
Model (5) in 13 cases and by the model with break, (5*), in five cases. In two regions only, the 
Voronezh and Ulyanovsk oblasts, prices rose in the course of convergence to the benchmark price. 
Although both have almost the same (estimated) starting disparity, about 25% below the 
benchmark, their convergence rates sufficiently differ. Expressed as a percentage, |eδ – 1|⋅100, the 
convergence rate equals 5% per month in the Voronezh Oblast and 0.9% per month in the 
Ulyanovsk Oblast, which yields disparity half-lives, tHLL,  equaling 1.1 and 6.4 years, respectively. 
A very probable reason is that the government of the Ulyanovsk Oblast maintained low prices in 
the region by price regulations and subsidies over many years, until the beginning of 2001, so 
decelerating price convergence. (Regarding this region, see also Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999, and 
Gardner and Brooks, 1994.) In the reminder of this region group, the starting disparity is on 
average 51% above the benchmark and varies from 21% to 87%. The convergence rate has the 
band of 0.7% to 10.8% per month with the average of 2.8%. This corresponds to tHLL from 0.5 to 
7.8 years, 4.1 years on average. There is a modest negative correlation, -0.383, between positive 
starting disparities and convergence rates. This suggests that convergence has a weak propensity 
to be the slower, the greater is the initial disparity. Except for Moscow, the structural breaks 
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decreased price disparities, thus playing again in favor of more integration.6 Regarding half-lives 
of random deviations from the long run paths, tHLS, their average over all 18 region pairs of this 
group is equal to 1.5 months with the variation from 0.7 to 2.8 months. 
It is interesting to note that among regions tending toward integration, four can be deemed as 
becoming integrated by the end of the time span covered because of practically completed 
convergence. These are the Nizhni Novgorod, Voronezh, Kurgan, and Orenburg oblasts. In 
January 2000, their estimated disparities, γeδ⋅72, had values of 0.01%, -0.64%, 0.07%, and 0.13% 
of the benchmark price, respectively.       
There is the only case of deterministic divergence, Model (5*) with δ > 0, among non-
integrated regions. Three price differentials in this region group contain unit root (in fact, the 
AR(1) with constant and no unit root would be valid for one of them). The rest 12 region pairs 
have a stepwise path of the price differential that is characterized by Model (7**). Thus, non-
integration was predominantly due to constant (apart from random shocks) price disparities, with 
one-shot switches, rather then to deterministic or stochastic divergence of prices. Price disparities 
increased as a result of the 1998 crisis in four out of those 12 region pairs and decreased in eight 
pairs. (With the only exception, the former are pairs with regions from the European part of 
Russia, and the latter contain regions from Siberia and the Far East.) This suggests that differences 
in prices between Russian regions became for the most part smaller after the crisis. No one case is 
found where a region was integrated before the crisis and became non-integrated after it. The half-
lives of random deviations, tHLS, among region pairs characterized by Model (7**) vary from 0.8 
to 3.1 months with the average of 1.6 months. 
Overall, the 1998 crisis strongly affected regional price dynamics. It caused a structural 
break in about a third of the time series under consideration. The only break is detected in the first 
month of the crisis, August 1998. The rest of the breaks are almost uniformly distributed among 
September, November, and December 1998, and January 1999. No one break is found in October 
1998 and February 1999. All early breaks, those in September 1998, occurred in the European part 
                                                          
6 The case of Moscow appears strange in general. There is abundant evidence of a special position of Moscow as “a 
country within a country” (see, e.g., Gluschenko, 2010). Its market is partitioned off from the Russian market by 
barriers erected by both the city government and organized crime. Therefore, there are strong grounds to expect 
Moscow not to move toward integration with any other region. Possibly, the shape of the Moscow price differential 
path has become by chance (maybe, due to structural break) such that it lends to fitting to Model (5*). However, the 
question of whether the Moscow prices do exhibit convergence to something else can be answered only by exploring 
their evolution beyond 2000. 
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of Russia. In its Asian part, the crisis affected price dynamics with a delay, starting to provoke 
structural breaks since November 1998 (except for the Republic of Buryatia, where the very early 
break occurred). 
One aspect of the crisis was dramatic devaluation of the Russian currency. By the beginning 
of 1999, it was devaluated 3.3-fold relative to the end of July 1998. The $/ruble exchange rate 
increased by 27% during August and by more 103% during September 1998. In October, the 
exchange rate was more or less stable (which could explain the absence of structural breaks in this 
month) and rose again during November and December, by 12% and 15%. As a result, domestic 
goods were displacing those imported from abroad. This caused expansion of inter-regional trade, 
which, in turn, facilitated improvements in market integration in the country. Besides, this is a 
reason for prices in many non-integrated regions to become closer to the benchmark price. 
The spatial structure of market integration is graphically presented in Fig. 4. There are only 
four non-integrated regions in the European part of Russia; the rest of them are in Siberia and the 
Far East. The farthest integrated regions lie in Western Siberia; there is no one such eastward of it. 
Nonetheless, there are five regions tending toward integration with the benchmark region in 
Eastern Siberia and the Far East. In the latter, four of five non-integrated regions are difficult-to-
access ones. However, one more region labeled by Gluschenko (2003) as difficult to access, the 
Murmansk Oblast (in the European part of the country), proves to be tending toward integration. 
Fig. 4 provides no evidence of a correlation between non-integration and the Red Belt 
regions as they are defined by Berkowitz and DeJong (1999). Curiously enough, our benchmark 
region itself, the Saratov Oblast, lies in the Red Belt. Out of 31 Red Belt regions, 19, or 63%, turn 
out to be integrated with the benchmark, six, or 20%, are tending toward integration with it, and 
five, or 17%, are non-integrated. Thus, the proportion of integrated regions in the Red Belt is 
greater than that in the whole region sample. At the same time, Gluschenko’s (2010) results 
corroborate findings due to Berkowitz and DeJong (1999), suggesting that the Red Belt 
considerably contributed to segmentation of the Russian market. Considering consequences of the 
1998 crisis resolves this seeming contradiction. Among eight regions that have become integrated 
due to structural breaks, as Models (7*) and (5**) suggest, six are those from the Red Belt. The 
crisis caused a 1.5-fold increase in the proportion of integrated regions in the Red Belt. Before the 
crisis, there were 37% of non-integrated regions in the Red Belt as compared to 30% among the 
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Fig. 4. Geographical pattern of market integration in Russia. Notes: Thick lines are borders of economic areas; see Table 2 for 
numerical designations of economic areas and regions. 
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rest of regions. Note moreover that anti-market policy in some Red Belt regions can impede 
market integration without an influence on our classification of regions. An example is the small 
convergence rate in the above-discussed Ulyanovsk Oblast. 
In general, the extent of market integration in Russia in 1994–2000 seems not to differ much 
from that in long-standing market economies. For instance, Ceglowski (2003) investigates the law 
of one price across 25 Canadian cities (country’s capital being the benchmark) for each of 45 
individual goods, applying the AR(1) model with constant. Averaging data reported in 
Ceglowski’s (2003) Table 2 over these 45 goods markets, the percentage of time series for which 
unit root can be rejected at the 10% significance level (in our terms, the percentage of integrated 
city pairs) equals 55%, which is close to the figure for Russia.7    
4. Conclusion 
Using the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods as the price representative, the spatial 
pattern of market integration in Russia in 1994–2000 was analyzed. It was found that over a half 
of Russian regions (54%) could be deemed as integrated with the benchmark region over 1994-
2000, and about a quarter of regions (24%) could be classed as tending toward integration with the 
benchmark. Among the latter, four regions exhibited convergence competed by the end of the time 
span under consideration. A bit more than one fifth of the regions (22%) were found non-
integrated. However, the latter assessment may be overstated, since the strict version of the law of 
one price was used as an indication of integration. It does not allow for such an irremovable 
market friction as spatial separation of regions, i.e. price disparities caused by transportation costs 
only.  
The introduction of the concept of regions intermediate between integrated and non-
integrated ones, namely, that of regions tending toward integration, was proved to be fruitful in 
revealing the features of the transition process. Omitting the relevant models, only six of 18 region 
pairs recognized as tending toward integration can be characterized by Model (7) or (7*). Thus, if 
the traditional approach to the time series analysis of market integration were used, 46 regions (or 
62% of the total) would be deemed as integrated with the benchmark, and 28 regions (38%) would 
                                                          
7 Ceglowski (2003) obtains the average (over goods) of median half-lives of random deviations, tHLS, equaling 0.5 
years, while the median tHLS is equal to 0.2 years (2.8 months) for Russian integrated regions. In fact, these figures 
should be closer, since the half-lives for Canada are computed from λs estimated in the ADF equations which yield, as 
a rule, a smaller absolute value of λ as compared to our Equation (7) because of additional lags. 
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be non-integrated. Such a pattern is not encouraging and suggests no indications of its further 
improvement. 
The results obtained shed light on reasons behind the patterns of the evolution of market 
integration in Russia presented in Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) and Gluschenko (2003). 
The improvement in market integration during 1994–2000, captured by rising an aggregated 
degree of integration in the former and by falling an aggregated degree of segmentation in the 
latter, can be assigned to a considerable proportion of regions that tended toward integration. At 
the same time, non-integrated regions with no such trend did not cause a rise in market 
segmentation, exhibiting, with the only exception, no price divergence. The changes in the 
mentioned degrees of integration/segmentation accelerated within several months after the 1998 
financial crisis in Russia. Judging from the results obtained here, this is due to that structural 
breaks induced by the crisis in inter-regional price differentials were nonsynchronous across 
regions and distributed over a few months.  
Overall, the results unambiguously suggest that the Russian market has been moving toward 
closer integration in 1994–2000, despite anti-integration forces (such as regional protectionism 
and organized crime; see Gluschenko, 2010) and anti-market policies in a considerable number of 
regions (predominantly in the Red Belt regions; see Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999). Among non-
integrated regions, four are difficult-to-access ones. Logically, difficult access presents an 
insurmountable market friction, so the lack of integration of these regions is more likely due to 
geographical realities than a particular economic policy, national or regional. The patter obtained 
appears encouraging and fundamentally differs from the pattern of poor market integration 
observed in a few initial years of the Russian transition by Berkowitz et al. (1998), Gardner and 
Brooks (1994), and Goodwin et al. (1999). What is more, the extent of market integration in 
Russia in 1994–2000 is comparable to that in long-standing market economies. 
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Appendix A: Unit root test statistics 
Table A1  
Critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics 
  
Break point, θ  Significance  
level 
No 
break 1998:08 1998:09 1998:10 1998:11 1998:12 1999:01 1999:02 
τNL and τNL(θ) for Equations (5) and (5*), respectively 
0.1% -5.553 -4.807 -4.805 -4.795 -4.795 -4.793 -4.788 -4.789 
1% -4.365 -4.068 -4.068 -4.064 -4.064 -4.061 -4.059 -4.058 
5% -3.512 -3.385 -3.385 -3.384 -3.384 -3.381 -3.379 -3.377 
10% -3.129 -3.038 -3.038 -3.038 -3.038 -3.035 -3.032 -3.032 
20% -2.707 -2.640 -2.640 -2.640 -2.640 -2.637 -2.635 -2.634 
τ*NL(θ) for Equation (5**) 
0.1%  -5.276 -5.287 -5.271 -5.255 -5.210 -5.219 -5.179 
1%  -4.078 -4.067 -4.048 -4.051 -4.033 -4.030 -4.012 
5%  -2.995 -2.986 -2.985 -2.988 -2.986 -2.986 -2.983 
10%  -2.458 -2.455 -2.458 -2.459 -2.461 -2.464 -2.465 
20%  -1.840 -1.839 -1.847 -1.853 -1.855 -1.858 -1.864 
τc and τc(θ) for AR(1) with constant and Equation (7**), respectively 
0.1% -4.251 -4.373 -4.368 -4.375 -4.372 -4.368 -4.373 -4.369 
1% -3.511 -3.676 -3.676 -3.674 -3.670 -3.668 -3.665 -3.661 
5% -2.897 -3.002 -3.000 -3.000 -2.996 -2.995 -2.993 -2.991 
10% -2.586 -2.656 -2.656 -2.656 -2.654 -2.654 -2.652 -2.651 
20% -2.223 -2.262 -2.263 -2.262 -2.262 -2.262 -2.262 -2.262 
τ0 and τ0(θ)for Equations (7) and (7*), respectively 
0.1% -3.363 -3.693 -3.701 -3.703 -3.703 -3.710 -3.714 -3.723 
1% -2.593 -2.902 -2.906 -2.913 -2.922 -2.925 -2.930 -2.937 
5% -1.945 -2.083 -2.091 -2.092 -2.099 -2.100 -2.106 -2.111 
10% -1.614 -1.670 -1.675 -1.674 -1.678 -1.682 -1.684 -1.686 
20% -1.228 -1.240 -1.239 -1.239 -1.241 -1.242 -1.242 -1.244 
Notes: 1. Sample size = 84 (1994:01 through 2000:12); 2. MacKinnon’s (1996) critical values are 
reported for τc and τ0; 3. Data for the AR(1) with constant, τc, are supplied for comparison only. 
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Appendix B: Actual time series vs. models 
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Fig. B1. Integrated regions. 
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Fig. B2. Regions tending toward integration with each other. 
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Fig. B3. Non-integrated regions. 
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Fig. B4. Non-integrated regions: deterministic divergence.  
Note: As there is no one pair with the Saratov Oblast that is fitted to Model (5) with δ > 0, a pair 
not reported in Table 2 is taken for this case (with γ = -0.045 and δ = 0.017)  
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Appendix C: Results across benchmarks 
Table C1 
Summary of estimation results across different benchmarks, number of time series (region pairs) 
 
Model characterizing dynamics 
Benchmark region Integrated
Tending 
toward 
integration
Non-
integrated (5*), δ > 0
(5*), 
δ < 0 (5**) (7**) (7*) 
(5), 
δ > 0
(5), 
δ < 0 (7) None
I. Northern Economic Area 
  1. Rep. of Karelia 10 35 29 3 15 1 21 6 0 20 3 5 
  2. Rep. of Komi  14 34 26 1 18 9 17 3 1 16 2 7 
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 10 44 20 3 26 2 12 3 0 18 5 5 
  4. Vologda Obl. 27 24 23 1 11 3 16 11 0 13 13 6 
  5. Murmansk Obl. 3 42 29 1 27 0 17 1 0 15 2 11 
II. Northwestern Economic Area 
  6. St. Petersburg City 16 21 37 1 15 0 21 7 1 6 9 14 
  7. Novgorod Obl. 22 23 29 2 12 2 24 10 0 11 10 3 
  8. Pskov Obl. 17 29 28 0 9 3 25 4 0 20 10 3 
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. 42 7 25 1 2 0 19 15 0 5 27 5 
III. Central Economic Area 
10. Bryansk Obl. 21 33 20 0 13 1 15 6 0 20 14 5 
11. Vladimir Obl. 22 23 29 1 11 1 24 7 0 12 14 4 
12. Ivanovo Obl. 21 23 30 0 11 2 25 5 0 12 14 5 
13. Kaluga Obl. 38 12 24 0 5 2 15 9 0 7 27 9 
14. Kostroma Obl. 18 17 39 5 6 2 28 4 1 11 12 5 
15. Moscow City 3 16 55 14 16 2 32 1 0 0 0 9 
16. Oryol Obl. 18 51 5 0 14 2 3 4 0 37 12 2 
17. Ryazan Obl. 23 15 36 0 9 2 29 7 0 6 14 7 
18. Smolensk Obl. 21 27 26 0 14 10 25 8 0 13 3 1 
19. Tver Obl. 24 12 38 3 4 4 30 7 0 8 13 5 
20. Tula Obl. 23 30 21 0 16 3 19 8 0 14 12 2 
21. Yaroslavl Obl. 18 27 29 1 16 3 24 6 1 11 9 3 
IV. Volga-Vyatka Economic Area 
22. Rep. of Mariy El  15 5 54 10 2 0 22 1 0 3 14 22 
23. Rep. of Mordovia 13 8 53 4 3 0 38 1 1 5 12 10 
24. Chuvash Rep.  16 17 41 3 10 3 23 3 0 7 10 15 
25. Kirov Obl. 34 6 34 7 2 0 22 7 1 4 27 4 
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 18 18 38 2 3 2 33 2 0 15 14 3 
V. Central Black-Soil Economic Area 
27. Belgorod Obl. 27 36 11 0 7 1 7 6 0 29 20 4 
28. Voronezh Obl. 13 51 10 0 16 4 4 2 0 35 7 6 
29. Kursk Obl. 25 40 9 0 9 1 7 4 0 31 20 2 
30. Lipetsk Obl. 24 35 15 0 16 0 12 4 0 19 20 3 
31. Tambov Obl. 28 24 22 0 12 4 19 13 0 12 11 3 
VI. Volga-Region Economic Area 
32. Rep. of Kalmykia  26 21 27 0 12 5 25 9 0 9 12 2 
33. Rep. of Tatarstan  13 33 28 2 16 0 23 0 0 17 13 3 
34. Astrakhan Obl. 26 28 20 3 9 5 12 3 1 19 18 4 
35. Volgograd Obl. 27 18 29 3 5 4 24 3 0 13 20 2 
36. Penza Obl. 26 28 20 0 8 1 11 6 0 20 19 9 
37. Samara Obl. 17 17 40 2 9 1 25 9 1 8 7 12 
38. Saratov Obl. 40 19 15 1 5 1 11 7 0 14 32 3 
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. 5 68 1 0 36 0 0 0 0 32 5 1 
 33
Model characterizing dynamics 
Benchmark region Integrated
Tending 
toward 
integration
Non-
integrated (5*), δ > 0
(5*), 
δ < 0 (5**) (7**) (7*) 
(5), 
δ > 0
(5), 
δ < 0 (7) None
VII. Northern Caucasus Economic Area 
40. Rep. of Adygeya  17 44 13 0 19 2 10 3 0 25 12 3 
41. Rep. of Dagestan 29 24 21 1 11 1 16 5 0 13 23 4 
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  41 19 14 1 2 2 5 4 0 17 35 8 
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 23 16 35 1 4 3 24 11 0 12 9 10 
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  29 33 12 1 6 2 6 2 0 27 25 5 
45. Krasnodar Krai 21 24 29 1 6 4 23 5 0 18 12 5 
46. Stavropol Krai 21 27 26 1 11 1 21 4 0 16 16 4 
47. Rostov Obl. 27 22 25 1 8 1 21 6 0 14 20 3 
VIII. Urals Economic Area 
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan  28 20 26 1 6 0 23 4 0 14 24 2 
49. Udmurt Rep.  25 14 35 4 5 1 27 8 0 9 16 4 
50. Kurgan Obl. 16 19 39 8 3 1 23 6 3 16 9 5 
51. Orenburg Obl. 29 12 33 8 0 1 21 4 2 12 24 2 
52. Perm Obl. 18 31 25 3 10 9 20 3 1 21 6 1 
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. 9 34 31 3 13 1 19 5 0 21 3 9 
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. 20 30 24 4 6 2 18 7 1 24 11 1 
IX. Western Siberian Economic Area 
55. Rep. of Altai 30 20 24 1 3 2 20 17 0 17 11 3 
56. Altai Krai 20 9 45 1 6 1 36 11 0 3 8 8 
57. Kemerovo Obl. 23 25 26 3 14 7 20 11 1 11 5 2 
58. Novosibirsk Obl. 12 26 36 6 13 1 27 6 0 13 5 3 
59. Omsk Obl. 27 26 21 3 8 2 13 9 0 18 16 5 
60. Tomsk Obl. 29 17 28 3 10 12 21 12 0 7 5 4 
61. Tyumen Obl. 20 26 28 0 2 1 16 11 0 24 8 12 
X. Eastern Siberian Economic Area 
62. Rep. of Buryatia 25 23 26 1 8 3 22 16 0 15 6 3 
63. Rep. of Tuva  7 20 47 7 8 0 35 2 1 12 5 4 
64. Rep. of Khakasia  15 18 41 7 4 0 22 6 1 14 9 11 
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai 27 12 35 6 5 3 21 18 0 7 6 8 
66. Irkutsk Obl. 20 12 42 1 5 1 35 10 0 7 9 6 
67. Chita Obl. 6 48 20 2 25 0 15 1 0 23 5 3 
XI. Far Eastern Economic Area 
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  3 14 57 2 13 0 48 0 0 1 3 7 
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl. 8 41 25 2 30 0 21 3 0 11 5 2 
70. Primorsky Krai 2 32 40 3 14 1 25 1 0 18 0 12 
71. Khabarovsk Krai 3 42 29 3 27 0 23 0 0 15 3 3 
72. Amur Obl. 12 27 35 2 18 0 32 8 0 9 4 1 
73. Kamchatka Obl. 2 7 65 19 6 0 46 0 0 1 2 0 
74. Magadan Obl. 1 17 56 0 2 0 12 0 0 15 1 44 
75. Sakhalin Obl. 3 38 33 0 23 0 16 0 0 15 3 17 
Notes: 1. To choose between Models (7**)/(7*) and (5), comparison of their estimated log likelihoods was applied rather 
than the Monte Carlo based specification test; 2. ‘Obl.’ stands for Oblast and ‘Rep.’ stands for Republic.  
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Appendix D: Full set of estimates 
Table D1 
Full set of estimates with the Saratov Oblast as the benchmark 
Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
  1. Rep. of Karelia (5*) -0.118 (0.052) -2.383/-2.263 0.293/ 0.343 10.005 (11.201) 98:09 -8.980 (10.679) -0.053 (0.021)**  
 (7**) -0.025 (0.028) -0.902/-0.902 0.785/ 0.785 0.200 (0.510) 98:09 -0.364 (0.161)**    
 (7*) -0.017 (0.012) -1.477/-1.477 0.138/ 0.138   98:09 -0.306 (0.041)***    
 (5) -0.422 (0.091) -4.528/-4.632 0.008/ 0.007 0.436 (0.060)***    -0.012 (0.003)***  
  2. Rep. of Komi  (5*) -0.497 (0.098) -4.637/-5.846 0.002/ 0.000 0.207 (0.084)** 98:12 0.266 (0.071)*** -0.013 (0.004)***  
  3. Arkhangelsk Obl. (5*) -0.208 (0.070) -2.803/-2.995 0.153/ 0.109 2.244 (1.106)** 98:09 -1.393 (0.942) -0.032 (0.009)***  
 (7**) -0.028 (0.033) -0.374/-0.344 0.907/ 0.911 0.202 (0.474) 98:09 -0.252 (0.113)**    
 (7*) -0.018 (0.013) -1.527/-1.413 0.128/ 0.153   98:09 -0.213 (0.048)***    
 (5) -0.389 (0.090) -3.965/-4.342 0.022/ 0.011 0.625 (0.074)***    -0.017 (0.003)***  
  4. Vologda Obl. (5*) -0.331 (0.084) -3.892/-3.930 0.016/ 0.015 3.059 (3.793) 98:09 -2.790 (3.719) -0.050 (0.020)**  
 (7**) -0.359 (0.088) -4.105/-4.091 0.003/ 0.003 0.056 (0.031)* 98:12 0.059 (0.037)    
 (5) -0.370 (0.088) -4.177/-4.185 0.015/ 0.014 0.144 (0.051)***    -0.010 (0.009)  
 (7) -0.143 (0.055) -2.681/-2.585 0.008/ 0.010         
  5. Murmansk Obl. (5*) -0.146 (0.058) -2.518/-0.244 0.242/ 0.947 3.642 (1.757)** 98:09 -2.499 (1.468)* -0.029 (0.009)***  
 (7**) -0.033 (0.032) -1.250/-1.037 0.653/ 0.739 0.487 (0.496) 98:09 -0.433 (0.162)***    
 (7*) -0.015 (0.011) -1.356/-1.414 0.167/ 0.153   98:09 -0.298 (0.048)***    
 (5) -0.238 (0.072) -3.447/-3.286 0.057/ 0.076 0.727 (0.146)***    -0.009 (0.004)**  
  6. St. Petersburg City (5*) -0.212 (0.067) -3.283/-3.190 0.062/ 0.075 9.330 (9.054) 98:09 -8.801 (8.911) -0.056 (0.017)***  
 (7**) -0.055 (0.040) -1.179/-0.205 0.684/ 0.931 0.341 (0.169)** 98:09 -0.361 (0.077)***    
 (5) -0.277 (0.077) -3.402/-3.584 0.062/ 0.044 0.182 (0.065)***    -0.001 (0.007)  
 (7) -0.069 (0.040) -1.467/-1.748 0.132/ 0.076         
  7. Novgorod Obl. (5*) -0.184 (0.067) -2.843/-1.649 0.143/ 0.625 11119 (42192) 98:09 -11117 (42190) -0.183 (0.068)***  
 (7**) -0.037 (0.037) -1.041/0.650 0.738/ 0.990 0.195 (0.274) 98:09 -0.329 (0.094)***    
 (7*) -0.021 (0.017) -1.209/-1.112 0.210/ 0.242   98:09 -0.281 (0.043)***    
 (5) -0.393 (0.090) -4.375/-4.375 0.010/ 0.010 0.163 (0.052)***    -0.010 (0.008)  
 (7) -0.141 (0.055) -2.134/-2.534 0.032/ 0.012         
  8. Pskov Obl. (5*) -0.269 (0.078) -3.307/NA 0.059/ NA 25561 (134935) 98:09 -25560 (134934) -0.208 (0.094)**  
 (7**) -0.081 (0.047) -1.655/-0.893 0.456/ 0.787 0.107 (0.082) 98:09 -0.171 (0.049)***    
 (7*) -0.042 (0.026) -1.537/-1.315 0.126/ 0.179   98:09 -0.168 (0.040)***    
 (5) -0.284 (0.078) -3.612/-3.632 0.042/ 0.040 0.439 (0.471)    -0.145 (0.112)  
 (7) -0.194 (0.063) -2.824/-3.065 0.005/ 0.003         
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
  9. Kaliningrad Obl. (5*) -0.212 (0.070) -2.989/-2.240 0.110/ 0.353 11508 (69755) 98:09 -11507 (69754) -0.185 (0.108)*  
 (7**) -0.103 (0.054) -1.922/-1.922 0.330/ 0.330 0.207 (0.105)* 98:09 -0.272 (0.079)***    
 (5) -0.272 (0.076) -3.562/-3.582 0.046/ 0.044 0.308 (0.327)    -0.078 (0.080)  
 (7) -0.217 (0.069) -3.137/-3.162 0.002/ 0.002         
10. Bryansk Obl. (5*) -0.169 (0.062) -2.679/-2.716 0.189/ 0.177 0.000 (0.000) 98:09 0.000 (0.000) 0.333 (0.274)  
 (7**) -0.143 (0.064) -2.133/-2.218 0.245/ 0.215 0.043 (0.044) 98:09 -0.109 (0.042)***    
 (7*) -0.167 (0.069) -2.218/-2.432 0.040/ 0.027   98:09 -0.073 (0.030)**    
 (5) -0.263 (0.078) -3.215/-2.773 0.086/ 0.181 -0.040 (0.056)    -0.014 (0.039)  
11. Vladimir Obl. (5*) -0.365 (0.086) -4.165/-4.255 0.008/ 0.007 0.000 (0.000) 98:11 0.000 (0.000) 0.131 (0.100)  
 (7**) -0.071 (0.046) -1.255/-0.806 0.650/ 0.813 0.136 (0.107) 98:09 -0.244 (0.057)***    
 (7*) -0.036 (0.024) -1.455/-1.216 0.143/ 0.208   98:09 -0.230 (0.041)***    
 (5) -0.345 (0.085) -3.957/-4.071 0.022/ 0.018 0.029 (0.040)    -0.002 (0.028)  
 (7) -0.298 (0.077) -3.650/-3.851 0.000/ 0.000         
12. Ivanovo Obl. (5*) -0.326 (0.082) -3.871/-2.210 0.017/ 0.366 153.6 (509.4) 98:09 -153.3 (509.3) -0.121 (0.057)**  
 (7**) -0.246 (0.079) -2.723/-0.960 0.088/ 0.766 0.096 (0.035)*** 98:09 -0.078 (0.041)*    
 (5) -0.323 (0.083) -3.670/-3.888 0.038/ 0.025 0.063 (0.045)    -0.006 (0.016)  
 (7) -0.215 (0.067) -2.995/-1.896 0.003/ 0.056         
13. Kaluga Obl. (5*) -0.437 (0.095) -4.528/-4.595 0.003/ 0.003 0.001 (0.002) 98:11 0.014 (0.011) 0.042 (0.017)**  
 (7**) -0.033 (0.037) -0.843/-0.888 0.802/ 0.789 0.134 (0.238) 98:09 -0.278 (0.072)***    
 (7*) -0.020 (0.018) -1.075/-1.095 0.256/ 0.249   98:09 -0.249 (0.036)***    
 (5) -0.345 (0.087) -3.867/-3.982 0.026/ 0.021 0.050 (0.035)    0.003 (0.013)  
 (7) -0.205 (0.067) -3.018/-3.057 0.003/ 0.003         
14. Kostroma Obl. (5*) -0.195 (0.066) -2.667/-1.799 0.192/ 0.556 0.000 (0.000) 98:09 0.000 (0.000) 0.266 (0.220)  
 (7**) -0.062 (0.045) -0.948/-0.402 0.770/ 0.902 0.082 (0.124) 98:09 -0.202 (0.055)***    
 (7*) -0.042 (0.027) -1.425/-1.646 0.150/ 0.105   98:09 -0.194 (0.043)***    
 (5) -0.390 (0.091) -4.090/-4.298 0.017/ 0.012 0.370 (0.270)    -0.150 (0.096)  
 (7) -0.257 (0.074) -3.265/-3.480 0.001/ 0.001         
15. Moscow City (5*) -0.220 (0.069) -3.269/-3.171 0.064/ 0.078 0.951 (0.314)*** 98:09 -0.478 (0.240)** -0.011 (0.005)**  
16. Oryol Obl. (5*) -0.133 (0.056) -2.326/-2.186 0.316/ 0.377 14.392 (31.253) 98:09 -14.924 (31.465) -0.083 (0.037)**  
 (7**) -0.131 (0.057) -2.249/-2.012 0.205/ 0.292 0.012 (0.051) 98:09 -0.106 (0.045)**    
 (7*) -0.134 (0.057) -2.284/-2.058 0.036/ 0.053   98:09 -0.098 (0.035)***    
 (5) -0.211 (0.070) -2.889/-2.431 0.151/ 0.294 -0.167 (0.112)    -0.031 (0.028)  
17. Ryazan Obl. (5*) -0.196 (0.068) -2.826/-2.857 0.147/ 0.140 5024 (31657) 98:09 -5023 (31656) -0.179 (0.112)  
 (7**) -0.151 (0.059) -2.433/-2.541 0.151/ 0.125 0.138 (0.049)*** 98:09 -0.148 (0.046)***    
 (5) -0.221 (0.068) -3.140/-3.251 0.099/ 0.081 0.030 (0.040)    0.012 (0.022)  
 (7) -0.150 (0.054) -2.619/-2.801 0.009/ 0.006         
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
18. Smolensk Obl. (5*) -0.406 (0.092) -4.559/-4.425 0.003/ 0.004 0.115 (0.202) 98:09 -0.182 (0.241) -0.010 (0.024)  
 (7**) -0.401 (0.091) -4.546/-4.416 0.001/ 0.001 0.056 (0.030)* 98:09 -0.109 (0.035)***    
 (5) -0.349 (0.085) -4.143/-4.108 0.016/ 0.017 -0.071 (0.078)    -0.030 (0.047)  
19. Tver Obl. (5*) -0.260 (0.079) -2.991/-3.303 0.110/ 0.060 -9148 (61464) 98:11 9149 (61465) -0.207 (0.113)*  
 (7**) -0.105 (0.055) -1.748/-1.335 0.411/ 0.614 0.161 (0.072)** 98:09 -0.211 (0.056)***    
 (5) -0.290 (0.078) -3.479/-3.717 0.054/ 0.035 0.813 (0.943)    -0.190 (0.118)  
 (7) -0.213 (0.068) -2.938/-3.130 0.004/ 0.002         
20. Tula Obl. (5*) -0.246 (0.073) -3.240/-3.382 0.068/ 0.051 47468 (504261) 98:09 -47468 (504261) -0.221 (0.189)  
 (7**) -0.234 (0.072) -3.113/-3.258 0.040/ 0.029 0.076 (0.038)* 98:09 -0.113 (0.042)***    
 (5) -0.277 (0.077) -3.473/-3.614 0.054/ 0.042 0.002 (0.012)    0.039 (0.090)  
21. Yaroslavl Obl. (5*) -0.296 (0.080) -3.693/-3.693 0.026/ 0.026 9.521 (15.979) 98:09 -9.304 (15.909) -0.069 (0.028)**  
 (7**) -0.216 (0.074) -2.550/-1.316 0.122/ 0.623 0.135 (0.038)*** 98:09 -0.103 (0.042)**    
 (5) -0.305 (0.080) -3.547/-3.799 0.047/ 0.030 0.070 (0.039)*    0.001 (0.011)  
 (7) -0.147 (0.055) -2.515/-1.972 0.012/ 0.047         
22. Rep. of Mariy El  (5*) -0.264 (0.077) -3.633/-3.435 0.029/ 0.045 -0.016 (0.015) 98:09 -0.023 (0.013)* 0.024 (0.013)*  
 (5**) -0.148 (0.061) -2.565/-2.432 0.088/ 0.103   98:09 -0.036 (0.057) 0.022 (0.031)  
 (7**) -0.261 (0.076) -3.459/-3.459 0.018/ 0.018 -0.111 (0.027)*** 98:10 0.040 (0.031)    
 (5) -0.282 (0.078) -3.778/-3.625 0.031/ 0.041 -0.058 (0.030)*    0.009 (0.009)  
 (7) -0.100 (0.050) -1.988/-2.025 0.045/ 0.042         
23. Rep. of Mordovia (5*) -0.247 (0.075) -3.075/-3.284 0.093/ 0.062 -0.080 (0.075) 98:12 0.036 (0.051) 0.007 (0.014)  
 (7**) -0.239 (0.074) -3.000/-3.232 0.050/ 0.030 -0.127 (0.027)*** 98:12 0.071 (0.031)**    
 (5) -0.243 (0.074) -3.111/-3.285 0.104/ 0.076 -0.035 (0.025)    0.017 (0.011)  
24. Chuvash Rep.  (5*) -0.458 (0.094) -4.883/-4.872 0.001/ 0.001 -0.032 (0.021) 98:09 -0.027 (0.011)** 0.011 (0.009)  
 (7**) -0.455 (0.093) -4.781/-4.896 0.000/ 0.000 -0.064 (0.017)*** 98:09 -0.019 (0.021)    
 (5) -0.471 (0.093) -4.940/-5.050 0.004/ 0.003 -0.074 (0.020)***    0.001 (0.006)  
 (7) -0.150 (0.059) -2.202/-2.524 0.027/ 0.012         
25. Kirov Obl. (5*) -0.170 (0.068) -2.241/-2.481 0.352/ 0.258 162595 (1803202) 98:09 -162595 (1803202) -0.236 (0.198)  
 (7**) -0.063 (0.044) -1.244/-1.429 0.656/ 0.569 0.083 (0.124) 98:09 -0.235 (0.061)***    
 (5) -0.283 (0.078) -3.487/-3.632 0.053/ 0.040 0.000 (0.000)    0.093 (0.134)  
 (7) -0.256 (0.075) -3.292/-3.407 0.001/ 0.001         
26. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. (5*) -0.271 (0.076) -3.334/-2.552 0.056/ 0.229 525.1 (2065.3) 98:09 -524.6 (2065.0) -0.147 (0.069)**  
 (7**) -0.069 (0.045) -1.145/-0.863 0.698/ 0.796 0.079 (0.081) 98:09 -0.141 (0.044)***    
 (7*) -0.042 (0.028) -1.345/-1.292 0.170/ 0.185   98:09 -0.139 (0.037)***    
 (5) -0.339 (0.083) -3.912/-4.081 0.024/ 0.017 0.353 (0.207)*    -0.114 (0.059)*  
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
27. Belgorod Obl. (5*) -0.255 (0.075) -3.164/-2.192 0.079/ 0.373 -0.317 (0.636) 98:12 0.200 (0.564) -0.025 (0.032)  
 (7**) -0.246 (0.074) -3.124/-3.309 0.039/ 0.026 -0.026 (0.043) 98:09 -0.044 (0.048)    
 (5) -0.259 (0.076) -3.246/-3.429 0.082/ 0.059 -0.104 (0.084)    -0.017 (0.024)  
 (7) -0.194 (0.066) -2.582/-2.916 0.010/ 0.004         
28. Voronezh Obl. (5*) -0.325 (0.085) -3.690/-2.755 0.026/ 0.166 1.079 (1.882) 98:09 -1.345 (1.949) -0.052 (0.024)***  
 (7**) -0.186 (0.064) -2.913/-2.011 0.061/ 0.293 0.022 (0.045) 98:09 -0.105 (0.046)**    
 (7*) -0.190 (0.064) -2.976/-2.070 0.009/ 0.052   98:09 -0.089 (0.032)***   0.127
 (5) a -0.368 (0.087) -4.169/-4.226 0.015/ 0.013 -0.258 (0.076)***    -0.051 (0.020)*** 0.103
29. Kursk Obl. (5*) -0.280 (0.076) -3.484/-2.375 0.041/ 0.296 0.000 (0.000) 98:08 0.000 (0.000) 0.166 (0.170)  
 (7**) -0.242 (0.074) -3.042/-1.968 0.046/ 0.311 -0.039 (0.033) 98:08 0.029 (0.039)    
 (5) -0.282 (0.080) -3.439/-3.152 0.058/ 0.097 -0.066 (0.080)    -0.029 (0.050)  
 (7) -0.239 (0.070) -3.192/-3.407 0.002/ 0.001         
30. Lipetsk Obl. (5*) -0.333 (0.085) -3.895/-3.915 0.016/ 0.015 -0.372 (0.482) 98:12 0.281 (0.448) -0.025 (0.020)  
 (7**) -0.296 (0.080) -3.622/-3.676 0.012/ 0.010 -0.074 (0.025)*** 98:12 0.034 (0.029)    
 (5) -0.313 (0.083) -3.776/-3.769 0.031/ 0.031 -0.065 (0.037)*    -0.006 (0.013)  
 (7) -0.183 (0.065) -2.605/-2.794 0.010/ 0.006         
31. Tambov Obl. (5*) -0.228 (0.070) -3.157/-1.406 0.080/ 0.721 -0.017 (0.043) 98:09 -0.080 (0.066) -0.005 (0.017)  
 (7**) -0.228 (0.069) -3.197/-3.314 0.033/ 0.025 -0.017 (0.032) 98:09 -0.067 (0.035)*    
 (7*) -0.223 (0.068) -3.222/-3.290 0.005/ 0.004   98:09 -0.080 (0.024)***    
 (5) -0.228 (0.068) -3.223/-3.338 0.085/ 0.069 -0.116 (0.070)    -0.016 (0.017)  
32. Rep. of Kalmykia  (5*) -0.425 (0.093) -4.572/NA 0.003/ NA 4.457 (15.022) 98:10 -4.416 (14.999) -0.063 (0.054)  
 (7**) -0.441 (0.094) -4.575/-4.681 0.001/ 0.001 0.065 (0.026)** 98:10 -0.046 (0.031)    
 (5) -0.452 (0.095) -4.662/-4.754 0.006/ 0.005 0.018 (0.021)    0.015 (0.019)  
 (7) -0.349 (0.083) -4.087/-4.183 0.000/ 0.000         
33. Rep. of Tatarstan  (5*) -0.272 (0.075) -3.576/-3.613 0.033/ 0.030 -0.237 (0.146) 98:12 0.107 (0.112) -0.007 (0.009)  
 (7**) -0.260 (0.072) -3.550/-3.593 0.014/ 0.013 -0.150 (0.028)*** 98:12 0.049 (0.032)    
 (5) -0.266 (0.073) -3.598/-3.631 0.043/ 0.041 -0.107 (0.039)***    0.002 (0.007)  
 (7) -0.078 (0.039) -1.977/-1.996 0.046/ 0.045         
34. Astrakhan Obl. (5*) -0.632 (0.106) -6.003/-5.957 0.000/ 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 98:11 0.003 (0.004) 0.070 (0.024)***  
 (7**) -0.460 (0.096) -4.672/-2.586 0.001/ 0.115 0.038 (0.027) 98:11 0.016 (0.032)    
 (5) -0.485 (0.097) -4.926/-4.989 0.004/ 0.004 0.032 (0.024)    0.009 (0.013)  
 (7) -0.326 (0.081) -3.707/-2.436 0.000/ 0.015         
35. Volgograd Obl. (5*) -0.504 (0.092) -5.347/-4.379 0.000/ 0.005 40.468 (85.060) 98:09 -40.238 (85.002) -0.106 (0.035)***  
 (7**) -0.400 (0.091) -4.429/-3.119 0.001/ 0.038 0.019 (0.020) 99:01 0.032 (0.023)    
 (5) -0.404 (0.087) -4.561/-3.103 0.007/ 0.105 0.282 (0.155)*    -0.120 (0.062)*  
 (7) -0.247 (0.073) -3.153/-2.420 0.002/ 0.016         
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
36. Penza Obl. (5*) -0.253 (0.075) -3.199/-2.176 0.073/ 0.379 -0.199 (0.343) 99:01 0.130 (0.302) -0.020 (0.027)  
 (7**) -0.234 (0.073) -3.142/-3.208 0.037/ 0.032 -0.019 (0.027) 98:09 -0.034 (0.031)    
 (5) -0.253 (0.075) -3.307/-3.360 0.073/ 0.067 -0.058 (0.047)    -0.009 (0.019)  
 (7) -0.176 (0.063) -2.560/-2.779 0.011/ 0.006         
37. Samara Obl. (5*) -0.693 (0.106) -6.472/-6.551 0.000/ 0.000 0.259 (0.078)*** 98:09 -0.079 (0.061) -0.008 (0.004)*  
 (7**) -0.633 (0.102) -6.152/-6.232 0.000/ 0.000 0.137 (0.017)*** 99:01 0.010 (0.020)    
 (5) -0.652 (0.103) -6.287/-6.351 0.000/ 0.000 0.159 (0.019)***    -0.002 (0.003)  
 (7) -0.086 (0.041) -1.744/-1.654 0.077/ 0.093         
38. Saratov Obl. (Benchmark region)        
39. Ulyanovsk Obl. (5*) -0.362 (0.084) -4.357/-4.291 0.005/ 0.006 -0.536 (0.196)*** 98:12 0.223 (0.164) -0.016 (0.005)***  
 (7**) -0.240 (0.064) -3.768/-3.768 0.008/ 0.008 -0.153 (0.036)*** 98:09 -0.052 (0.040)    
 (5) -0.313 (0.077) -4.055/-4.055 0.018/ 0.018 -0.274 (0.047)***    -0.009 (0.004)**  
40. Rep. of Adygeya  (5*) -0.377 (0.089) -4.223/-4.223 0.007/ 0.007 -0.337 (0.935) 98:10 0.262 (0.889) -0.036 (0.043)  
 (7**) -0.352 (0.085) -4.118/-4.118 0.003/ 0.003 -0.015 (0.028) 98:09 -0.016 (0.033)    
 (5) -0.377 (0.088) -4.219/-4.305 0.014/ 0.012 -0.070 (0.058)    -0.028 (0.034)  
 (7) -0.319 (0.081) -3.926/-3.926 0.000/ 0.000         
41. Rep. of Dagestan (5*) -0.514 (0.098) -5.350/-5.242 0.000/ 0.000 71.4 (277.1) 98:09 -71.1 (277.0) -0.115 (0.066)*  
 (7**) -0.553 (0.100) -5.529/-5.519 0.000/ 0.000 0.031 (0.023) 98:12 0.027 (0.028)    
 (5) -0.550 (0.100) -5.461/-5.486 0.002/ 0.002 0.063 (0.032)*    -0.006 (0.012)  
 (7) -0.376 (0.085) -4.580/-2.914 0.000/ 0.004         
42. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  (5*) -0.205 (0.057) -3.597/-3.607 0.032/ 0.031 480.3 (2355.0) 98:09 -480.8 (2355.7) -0.137 (0.086)  
 (7**) -0.165 (0.063) -2.608/-2.629 0.110/ 0.106 0.121 (0.063)* 98:09 -0.120 (0.061)*    
 (5) -0.221 (0.070) -3.080/-3.137 0.109/ 0.099 0.031 (0.055)    0.011 (0.029)  
 (7) -0.170 (0.059) -2.792/-2.854 0.006/ 0.005         
43. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. (5*) -0.379 (0.089) -4.352/-4.242 0.005/ 0.007 0.000 (0.001) 98:11 0.002 (0.006) 0.075 (0.044)*  
 (7**) -0.271 (0.078) -3.553/-3.488 0.014/ 0.017 -0.054 (0.034) 98:11 0.098 (0.040)**    
 (7*) -0.249 (0.076) -3.340/-3.275 0.004/ 0.005   98:11 0.056 (0.031)*    
 (5) -0.240 (0.075) -3.284/-3.224 0.076/ 0.085 0.382 1.592)    -0.193 (0.361)  
44. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  (5*) -0.332 (0.088) -3.773/-3.773 0.021/ 0.021 0.000 (0.000) 98:11 0.002 (0.006) 0.075 (0.067)  
 (7**) -0.241 (0.074) -3.104/-3.265 0.040/ 0.028 0.048 (0.040) 98:09 -0.045 (0.045)    
 (5) -0.256 (0.076) -3.111/-3.354 0.104/ 0.067 0.010 (0.035)    0.016 (0.054)  
 (7) -0.235 (0.071) -3.053/-3.298 0.003/ 0.001         
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
45. Krasnodar Krai (5*) -0.579 (0.103) -5.578/-3.024 0.000/ 0.103 0.000 (0.000) 98:11 0.002 (0.004) 0.078 (0.043)*  
 (7**) -0.445 (0.094) -4.600/-2.593 0.001/ 0.113 -0.041 (0.026) 98:11 0.067 (0.032)**    
 (7*) -0.416 (0.092) -4.363/-2.289 0.000/ 0.036   98:11 0.029 (0.022)    
 (5) -0.397 (0.090) -4.121/-3.369 0.016/ 0.066 0.086 (0.405)    -0.185 (0.729)  
 (7) -0.394 (0.089) -4.234/-2.169 0.000/ 0.030         
46. Stavropol Krai (5*) -0.451 (0.094) -4.831/-4.778 0.001/ 0.002 0.000 (0.000) 98:11 0.000 (0.001) 0.114 (0.093)  
 (7**) -0.402 (0.091) -4.310/-4.434 0.002/ 0.001 -0.025 (0.022) 98:11 0.042 (0.026)    
 (5) -0.410 (0.091) -4.392/-4.496 0.010/ 0.008 0.045 (0.148)    -0.118 (0.407)  
 (7) -0.401 (0.089) -4.418/-4.510 0.000/ 0.000         
47. Rostov Obl. (5*) -0.400 (0.090) -4.391/-4.446 0.005/ 0.004 0.000 (0.000) 98:10 0.000 (0.000) 0.139 (0.109)  
 (7**) -0.385 (0.089) -4.243/-4.325 0.002/ 0.002 -0.054 (0.023)** 98:12 0.040 (0.028)    
 (5) -0.392 (0.088) -4.437/-4.437 0.009/ 0.009 0.000 (0.000)    0.118 (0.103)  
 (7) -0.321 (0.083) -3.759/-3.865 0.000/ 0.000         
48. Rep. of Bashkortostan  (5*) -0.279 (0.078) -3.610/NA 0.031/ NA 261.2 (2111.6) 98:09 -260.8 (2111.1) -0.151 (0.142)  
 (7**) -0.216 (0.068) -3.219/-2.298 0.031/ 0.189 -0.017 (0.040) 99:01 0.033 (0.043)    
 (5) -0.275 (0.077) -3.595/-4.921 0.043/ 0.004 0.389 (0.566)    -0.149 (0.152)  
 (7) -0.215 (0.066) -3.285/-2.346 0.001/ 0.019         
49. Udmurt Rep.  (5*) -0.258 (0.075) -3.506/-3.421 0.039/ 0.046 -575.8 (4378.3) 98:12 576.1 (4378.7) -0.146 (0.128)  
 (7**) -0.206 (0.068) -3.020/-3.020 0.048/ 0.048 -0.032 (0.037) 98:12 0.069 (0.041)*    
 (7*) -0.220 (0.069) -3.179/-3.179 0.006/ 0.006   98:12 0.043 (0.029)    
 (5) -0.294 (0.079) -3.785/-3.717 0.030/ 0.034 0.239 (0.282)    -0.111 (0.117)  
 (7) -0.229 (0.068) -3.379/-3.379 0.001/ 0.001         
50. Kurgan Obl. (5*) -0.563 (0.101) -5.835/-3.276 0.000/ 0.062 -13.318 (15.247) 99:01 13.780 (15.307) -0.086 (0.017)***  
 (7**) -0.212 (0.056) -3.752/-2.358 0.008/ 0.171 -0.033 (0.037) 98:12 0.084 (0.042)**    
 (7*) -0.205 (0.054) -3.718/-2.346 0.001/ 0.033   98:12 0.059 (0.033)*   0.009
 (5) -0.476 (0.095) -5.185/-5.003 0.003/ 0.004 0.475 (0.110)***    -0.090 (0.023)*** 0.204
51. Orenburg Obl. (5*) -0.559 (0.101) -5.526/-5.526 0.000/ 0.000 -3.107 (5.089) 99:01 3.433 (5.142) -0.073 (0.021)***  
 (7**) -0.281 (0.072) -3.875/-3.875 0.006/ 0.006 -0.021 (0.035) 98:11 0.071 (0.041)*    
 (7*) -0.277 (0.072) -3.865/-3.865 0.001/ 0.001   98:11 0.053 (0.029)*   0.003
 (5) -0.541 (0.099) -5.433/-5.433 0.002/ 0.002 0.337 (0.088)***    -0.077 (0.023)*** 0.388
52. Perm Obl. (5*) -0.325 (0.080) -4.059/-4.059 0.011/ 0.011 1.299 (0.876) 98:09 -0.841 (0.801) -0.040 (0.011)***  
 (7**) -0.260 (0.076) -3.437/-3.437 0.019/ 0.019 0.059 (0.034)* 98:11 0.118 (0.040)***   0.011
 (5) -0.376 (0.085) -4.421/-4.421 0.009/ 0.009 0.370 (0.067)***    -0.027 (0.006)*** 0.180
53. Sverdlovsk Obl. (5*) -0.371 (0.086) -4.152/-4.303 0.008/ 0.006 1.157 (0.516)** 98:09 -0.720 (0.463) -0.028 (0.007)***  
 (7**) -0.258 (0.075) -3.253/-3.455 0.029/ 0.018 0.144 (0.041)*** 98:11 0.075 (0.047)    
 (5) -0.348 (0.085) -4.012/-4.105 0.020/ 0.017 0.338 (0.062)***    -0.014 (0.005)***  
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
54. Chelyabinsk Obl. (5*) -0.560 (0.102) -5.511/-5.484 0.000/ 0.000 0.714 (0.360)* 98:09 -0.428 (0.328) -0.029 (0.007)***  
 (7**) -0.279 (0.076) -3.669/-3.669 0.001/ 0.001 0.089 (0.028)*** 98:11 0.051 (0.033)    
 (5) -0.511 (0.098) -5.222/-5.239 0.003/ 0.002 0.228 (0.040)***    -0.016 (0.005)***  
55. Rep. of Altai (5*) -0.484 (0.095) -4.622/-5.554 0.002/ 0.000 0.059 (0.051) 99:01 0.111 (0.047)** -0.004 (0.009)  
 (7**) -0.478 (0.094) -4.650/-5.077 0.001/ 0.000 0.047 (0.030) 99:01 0.104 (0.037)***    
 (7*) -0.444 (0.091) -4.670/-4.858 0.000/ 0.000   99:01 0.148 (0.024)***   0.118
 (5) -0.452 (0.093) -4.658/-4.852 0.006/ 0.005 0.210 (0.058)***    -0.015 (0.008)* 0.050
56. Altai Krai (5*) -0.557 (0.097) -5.510/-5.738 0.000/ 0.000 -0.100 (0.101) 99:01 0.153 (0.123) -0.004 (0.014)  
 (7**) -0.553 (0.096) -5.572/-5.788 0.000/ 0.000 -0.075 (0.016)*** 99:01 0.124 (0.020)***    
 (5) -0.322 (0.082) -3.894/-2.850 0.025/ 0.160 0.073 (0.096)    -0.042 (0.068)  
57. Kemerovo Obl. (5*) -0.561 (0.097) -5.793/-5.797 0.000/ 0.000 0.100 (0.060) 99:01 0.200 (0.057)*** -0.013 (0.005)***  
 (5**) -0.511 (0.093) -5.483/-5.483 0.001/ 0.001   99:01 0.300 (0.047)*** -0.013 (0.005)**  
58. Novosibirsk Obl. (5*) -0.199 (0.065) -3.063/-3.063 0.096/ 0.096 0.559 (0.372) 98:09 -0.300 (0.294) -0.018 (0.011)  
 (7**) -0.244 (0.066) -3.629/-3.701 0.012/ 0.010 0.113 (0.036)*** 99:01 0.077 (0.041)*    
 (5) -0.233 (0.067) -3.455/-3.475 0.056/ 0.054 0.205 (0.069)***    -0.005 (0.007)  
59. Omsk Obl. (5*) -0.609 (0.104) -5.790/-5.847 0.000/ 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 99:01 0.005 (0.006) 0.059 (0.022)***  
 (7**) -0.406 (0.090) -4.356/-4.491 0.002/ 0.001 -0.022 (0.025) 99:01 0.065 (0.029)**    
 (7*) -0.405 (0.090) -4.389/-4.519 0.000/ 0.000   99:01 0.044 (0.018)**    
 (5) -0.376 (0.088) -4.138/-4.259 0.016/ 0.013 0.022 (0.035)    0.000 (0.031)  
60. Tomsk Obl. (5*) -0.580 (0.098) -5.948/-5.927 0.000/ 0.000 0.002 (0.016) 98:11 0.151 (0.035)*** 0.003 (0.006)  
 (7**) -0.576 (0.097) -5.949/-5.923 0.000/ 0.000 0.002 (0.020) 98:11 0.168 (0.025)***    
 (7*) -0.577 (0.097) -5.990/-5.964 0.000/ 0.000   98:11 0.170 (0.016)***   0.460
 (5) -0.370 (0.086) -4.175/-4.290 0.015/ 0.012 0.227 (0.070)***    -0.018 (0.009)* 0.000
61. Tyumen Obl. (5*) -0.231 (0.070) -3.230/-3.291 0.069/ 0.061 0.855 (0.577) 98:09 -0.388 (0.471) -0.028 (0.011)**  
 (7**) b -0.199 (0.067) -2.874/-2.961 0.065/ 0.054 0.115 (0.051)** 98:12 0.106 (0.056)*   0.147
 (5) -0.236 (0.071) -3.266/-3.325 0.079/ 0.071 0.395 (0.119)***    -0.019 (0.008)** 0.214
62. Rep. of Buryatia (5*) -0.415 (0.092) -4.361/-4.539 0.005/ 0.003 0.226 (0.092)** 98:08 0.184 (0.068)*** -0.011 (0.005)**  
63. Rep. of Tuva  (5*) -0.436 (0.093) -4.616/-4.667 0.002/ 0.002 0.303 (0.081)*** 98:12 0.162 (0.053)*** -0.004 (0.003)  
 (7**) -0.427 (0.092) -4.571/-4.628 0.001/ 0.001 0.236 (0.033)*** 98:12 0.176 (0.040)***   0.173
 (5) -0.363 (0.086) -4.129/-4.211 0.016/ 0.014 0.527 (0.070)***    -0.010 (0.003)*** 0.027
64. Rep. of Khakasia  (5*) -0.534 (0.097) -5.285/-5.485 0.000/ 0.000 0.110 (0.040)*** 98:11 0.071 (0.024)*** 0.004 (0.005)  
 (7**) -0.534 (0.097) -5.378/-5.504 0.000/ 0.000 0.141 (0.023)*** 98:11 0.061 (0.028)**    
 (5) -0.507 (0.096) -5.218/-5.280 0.003/ 0.002 0.214 (0.034)***    -0.004 (0.003)  
65. Krasnoyarsk Krai (5*) -0.561 (0.099) -5.575/-5.693 0.000/ 0.000 0.045 (0.020)** 98:11 0.133 (0.024)*** 0.008 (0.005)*  
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Region Model λ 
Adjusted      
t-statistics of λ 
(PP/ADF) 
Unit root test  
p-values 
(PP/ADF) 
γ  Break point γB δ  p(H0)
66. Irkutsk Obl. (5*) -0.599 (0.103) -5.886/-5.800 0.000/ 0.000 0.157 (0.057)*** 99:01 0.232 (0.046)*** -0.003 (0.004)  
 (7**) -0.598 (0.102) -5.940/-5.850 0.000/ 0.000 0.132 (0.029)*** 98:11 0.223 (0.038)***   0.232
 (5) -0.439 (0.093) -4.699/-4.743 0.006/ 0.005 0.465 (0.079)***    -0.013 (0.004)*** 0.004
67. Chita Obl. (5*) -0.621 (0.102) -5.724/-6.066 0.000/ 0.000 0.576 (0.109)*** 98:12 0.115 (0.081) -0.013 (0.002)***  
 (7**) -0.358 (0.087) -3.957/-4.129 0.005/ 0.003 0.255 (0.043)*** 98:12 0.217 (0.053)***   0.000
 (5) -0.606 (0.101) -5.734/-6.024 0.001/ 0.001 0.721 (0.048)***    -0.015 (0.002)*** 0.228
68. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  (5*) -0.436 (0.092) -4.725/-4.725 0.002/ 0.002 0.848 (0.160)*** 98:11 0.556 (0.098)*** -0.002 (0.003)  
 (7**) -0.446 (0.092) -4.830/-4.830 0.000/ 0.000 0.765 (0.063)*** 98:11 0.575 (0.084)***   0.160
 (5) -0.271 (0.074) -3.540/-3.646 0.048/ 0.039 1.697 (0.237)***    -0.009 (0.003)*** 0.002
69. Jewish Autonomous Obl. (5*) -0.397 (0.089) -4.335/-4.455 0.005/ 0.004 0.336 (0.088)*** 98:11 0.238 (0.062)*** -0.008 (0.003)**  
70. Primorsky Krai (5*) -0.157 (0.061) -2.462/-2.561 0.262/ 0.226 2.154 (0.799)*** 98:09 -1.052 (0.583)* -0.020 (0.006)***  
 (7**) -0.043 (0.033) -1.223/-1.321 0.665/ 0.621 0.646 (0.314)** 98:09 -0.365 (0.111)***    
 (5) -0.327 (0.083) -3.845/-3.929 0.027/ 0.023 0.869 (0.098)***    -0.010 (0.003)***  
71. Khabarovsk Krai (5*) -0.324 (0.083) -3.892/-3.901 0.016/ 0.015 0.469 (0.128)*** 98:12 0.239 (0.085)*** -0.007 (0.004)*  
72. Amur Obl. (5*) -0.333 (0.079) -4.048/-4.216 0.011/ 0.007 0.237 (0.086)*** 99:01 0.240 (0.065)*** -0.005 (0.005)  
 (7**) -0.311 (0.074) -3.919/-4.184 0.005/ 0.003 0.176 (0.042)*** 99:01 0.225 (0.052)***   0.222
 (5) -0.272 (0.075) -3.644/-3.644 0.040/ 0.040 0.560 (0.109)***    -0.013 (0.005)*** 0.010
73. Kamchatka Obl. (5*) -0.514 (0.099) -4.915/-5.190 0.001/ 0.000 0.744 (0.119)*** 98:12 0.497 (0.072)*** 0.001 (0.002)  
 (7**) -0.509 (0.097) -5.019/-5.273 0.000/ 0.000 0.776 (0.054)*** 98:12 0.489 (0.070)***   0.452
 (5) -0.325 (0.081) -3.896/-3.997 0.025/ 0.020 1.498 (0.172)***    -0.007 (0.002)*** 0.000
74. Magadan Obl. (5*) -0.133 (0.056) -2.460/-2.375 0.261/ 0.295 1.110 (0.354)*** 98:12 0.505 (0.181)*** -0.005 (0.005)  
 (7**) -0.113 (0.050) -2.279/-2.282 0.195/ 0.194 0.872 (0.152)*** 98:12 0.446 (0.145)***    
 (5) -0.147 (0.058) -2.633/-2.514 0.223/ 0.264 1.910 (0.413)***    -0.011 (0.004)**  
 (7) -0.011 (0.010) -1.127/-1.125 0.234/ 0.235         
75. Sakhalin Obl. (5*) -0.146 (0.059) -2.604/-2.485 0.211/ 0.252 0.921 (0.300)*** 98:12 0.458 (0.171)*** -0.008 (0.005)  
 (7**) -0.110 (0.051) -2.150/-2.150 0.239/ 0.239 0.618 (0.130)*** 98:12 0.364 (0.121)***    
 (5) -0.153 (0.059) -2.772/-2.606 0.182/ 0.232 1.613 (0.361)***    -0.014 (0.005)***  
 (7) -0.012 (0.012) -1.006/-1.006 0.280/ 0.280         
Notes: 1. PP and ADF stand for the Phillips-Perron test and augmented Dickey-Fuller test, respectively; 2. p(H0) is the p-value of the specification test, the null 
hypothesis being a specification indicated in the second column of a respective row; 3. Standard errors are in parenthesis; 4. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*); 5. Chosen specification is marked with bold font; 6. NA means that the nonlinear OLS algorithm has failed in estimating relevant regressions; 7. ‘Obl.’ 
stands for Oblast and ‘Rep.’ stands for Republic. 
a The J test rejects Model (7*) in favor of (5): P(5) enters in Model (7*) significantly (p-value = 0.003), while P(7*) enters in Model (5) insignificantly (p-value = 0.230); 
P(⋅) is the vector of fitted values of Prs from Model (⋅). 
b The J test rejects Model (5) in favor of (7**): P(5) enters in Model (7**) with p-value of 0.230, while P(7**) enters in Model (5) with p-value of 0.023. 
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